{"title":"It Is Time to Resolve Nigeria’s Monetary Policy Conundrums","authors":"Ayo Teriba","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2947533","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In the last six years, Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) decisions have included easing the monetary policy rate (MPR) just once, November 2015, and the cash reserve requirement (CRR) has been eased just twice, July and November 2015. In contrast, the MPR has been tightened ten times, including twice during the recession in 2016, and the CRR has also been tightened ten times, including once in 2016. It is very puzzling that MPC finds extraneous reasons, typically about banks or foreign exchange supply, to tighten monetary policy, even when the economy is contracting and can do with some liquidity boost. \nThis paper demonstrates how MPC decisions have become disconnected from economic realities, and suggests the urgent steps that must be taken to ensure a reconnect. We compare the patterns in historical monetary policy decisions across Soludo, Lamido, and Emefiele regimes to trace the emergence of the disconnect and establish the best strategies for reconnecting. We also clarify the numerous misconceptions about the nominal MPR, positive real interest rate, foreign portfolio inflows that are often expressed in the MPC communiques. \nThe economy is bigger and more important than the banks, but MPC statements continue to dwell on banks’ conditions, rather than on economic conditions, indicative of lapses in banking supervision. Failures of micro/macro-prudential policies are spilling over into the monetary policy space, inflicting high growth and employment costs on the economy. What the UK government has done in reforming the Bank of England over the last two decades, especially in functionally separating responsibilities for monetary policy and micro/macro-prudential policies, is an example of the reforms required in Nigeria. \nApart from banks’ conditions, MPC statements have also had a lot to say about the need to keep the policy rate high enough to attract foreign portfolio inflows, rather than ease rates to stimulate growth and investment, betraying another spill-over into the monetary policy space from weaknesses in the foreign exchange policies of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). Nigeria’s foreign investment policy must be recalibrated away from preoccupation with volatile and easily reversible portfolio inflows towards greater reliance on harder to reverse diaspora and foreign direct investment inflows. \nWe argue strongly for immediate reforms in Nigeria’s monetary policy processes, Nigeria’s banking supervision arrangements, and Nigeria’s foreign investment policies. Those reforms are needed to ensure an orderly transition to a low MPR/low CRR regime that is urgently needed to boost growth and investment.","PeriodicalId":247622,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Fiscal & Monetary Policy in Developing Economies (Topic)","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2017-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Fiscal & Monetary Policy in Developing Economies (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2947533","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In the last six years, Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) decisions have included easing the monetary policy rate (MPR) just once, November 2015, and the cash reserve requirement (CRR) has been eased just twice, July and November 2015. In contrast, the MPR has been tightened ten times, including twice during the recession in 2016, and the CRR has also been tightened ten times, including once in 2016. It is very puzzling that MPC finds extraneous reasons, typically about banks or foreign exchange supply, to tighten monetary policy, even when the economy is contracting and can do with some liquidity boost.
This paper demonstrates how MPC decisions have become disconnected from economic realities, and suggests the urgent steps that must be taken to ensure a reconnect. We compare the patterns in historical monetary policy decisions across Soludo, Lamido, and Emefiele regimes to trace the emergence of the disconnect and establish the best strategies for reconnecting. We also clarify the numerous misconceptions about the nominal MPR, positive real interest rate, foreign portfolio inflows that are often expressed in the MPC communiques.
The economy is bigger and more important than the banks, but MPC statements continue to dwell on banks’ conditions, rather than on economic conditions, indicative of lapses in banking supervision. Failures of micro/macro-prudential policies are spilling over into the monetary policy space, inflicting high growth and employment costs on the economy. What the UK government has done in reforming the Bank of England over the last two decades, especially in functionally separating responsibilities for monetary policy and micro/macro-prudential policies, is an example of the reforms required in Nigeria.
Apart from banks’ conditions, MPC statements have also had a lot to say about the need to keep the policy rate high enough to attract foreign portfolio inflows, rather than ease rates to stimulate growth and investment, betraying another spill-over into the monetary policy space from weaknesses in the foreign exchange policies of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). Nigeria’s foreign investment policy must be recalibrated away from preoccupation with volatile and easily reversible portfolio inflows towards greater reliance on harder to reverse diaspora and foreign direct investment inflows.
We argue strongly for immediate reforms in Nigeria’s monetary policy processes, Nigeria’s banking supervision arrangements, and Nigeria’s foreign investment policies. Those reforms are needed to ensure an orderly transition to a low MPR/low CRR regime that is urgently needed to boost growth and investment.
在过去的六年里,货币政策委员会(MPC)的决定包括仅在2015年11月一次放松货币政策利率(MPR),以及仅在2015年7月和11月两次放松现金准备金率(CRR)。相比之下,MPR已经收紧了10次,包括2016年经济衰退期间的两次,CRR也收紧了10次,包括2016年的一次。非常令人费解的是,MPC找到了一些无关的理由(通常是关于银行或外汇供应)来收紧货币政策,即使是在经济萎缩、可以采取一些流动性刺激措施的时候。本文展示了货币政策委员会的决策是如何与经济现实脱节的,并提出了必须采取的紧急措施,以确保重新联系。我们比较了Soludo、Lamido和Emefiele政权的历史货币政策决策模式,以追踪脱节的出现,并建立最佳的重新连接策略。我们还澄清了在货币政策委员会公报中经常表达的关于名义MPR、正实际利率、外国投资组合流入的许多误解。经济比银行更大、更重要,但货币政策委员会的声明继续关注银行状况,而不是经济状况,这表明银行监管存在失误。微观/宏观审慎政策的失败正蔓延至货币政策领域,给经济带来高增长和就业成本。过去二十年来,英国政府在改革英国央行(Bank of England)方面所做的工作,尤其是在职能上分离货币政策和微观/宏观审慎政策的责任,是尼日利亚需要进行改革的一个例子。除了银行的状况外,货币政策委员会的声明也有很多关于保持政策利率足够高以吸引外国投资组合流入的必要性,而不是放松利率以刺激增长和投资,这暴露了尼日利亚中央银行(CBN)外汇政策弱点对货币政策空间的另一个溢出效应。尼日利亚的外国投资政策必须重新调整,从专注于不稳定和容易逆转的投资组合流入,转向更多地依赖更难逆转的侨民和外国直接投资流入。我们强烈主张立即改革尼日利亚的货币政策程序、尼日利亚的银行监管安排和尼日利亚的外国投资政策。这些改革是确保向低MPR/低CRR制度有序过渡所必需的,而低MPR/低CRR制度是促进增长和投资的迫切需要。