{"title":"Lithuania","authors":"I. Matonytė","doi":"10.1787/mei-v2018-12-table78-en","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Since early 1990s, the electoral campaigns in Lithuania take place within the framework of long-term parliamentary party agreements on Euro-Atlantic integration (more specifically, in the context of fear of pernicious geo-political interference from Russia) and free market reforms (or, in other words, eagerness to integrate into the European market and to be part of the euro-zone). The overall distance between parties on the socioeconomic scale is fairly small and, among political elites, the pro-Western consensus is apparent. There are no real outcast parties in Lithuania. The Lithuanian society itself is not ravaged by deep socio-political cleavages and its ethnic, religious, or corporate divides are not sharp. Yet, electoral volatility is high and political parties are numerous. However, governments in Lithuania are relatively stable. The ministerial government model entrenches itself in Lithuania. Since 2000 the increasingly unstable multi-party system necessitates that the coalition governments are based on inter-party bargaining. The tendency is towards ‘oversized’ cabinets and surplus coalitions. As a rule, publicly available coalition agreements resemble rather memorandums of understanding than seriously thought-through documents of partnership for a particular policy agenda. Coalitions in Lithuania accommodate office-seeking parties and politicians. Commitment of the parties to the coalition in question is routinely maintained via the distribution of ministerial portfolios. The coalition management machinery produces personified accommodations, dubious compromises, delays, and postponements as typical modes of conflict resolution. These deficiencies in turn lead to erosion of political accountability, which further breeds frustration and political protest.","PeriodicalId":413673,"journal":{"name":"OECD Statistics on International Trade in Services, Volume 2019 Issue 1","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"OECD Statistics on International Trade in Services, Volume 2019 Issue 1","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1787/mei-v2018-12-table78-en","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

Since early 1990s, the electoral campaigns in Lithuania take place within the framework of long-term parliamentary party agreements on Euro-Atlantic integration (more specifically, in the context of fear of pernicious geo-political interference from Russia) and free market reforms (or, in other words, eagerness to integrate into the European market and to be part of the euro-zone). The overall distance between parties on the socioeconomic scale is fairly small and, among political elites, the pro-Western consensus is apparent. There are no real outcast parties in Lithuania. The Lithuanian society itself is not ravaged by deep socio-political cleavages and its ethnic, religious, or corporate divides are not sharp. Yet, electoral volatility is high and political parties are numerous. However, governments in Lithuania are relatively stable. The ministerial government model entrenches itself in Lithuania. Since 2000 the increasingly unstable multi-party system necessitates that the coalition governments are based on inter-party bargaining. The tendency is towards ‘oversized’ cabinets and surplus coalitions. As a rule, publicly available coalition agreements resemble rather memorandums of understanding than seriously thought-through documents of partnership for a particular policy agenda. Coalitions in Lithuania accommodate office-seeking parties and politicians. Commitment of the parties to the coalition in question is routinely maintained via the distribution of ministerial portfolios. The coalition management machinery produces personified accommodations, dubious compromises, delays, and postponements as typical modes of conflict resolution. These deficiencies in turn lead to erosion of political accountability, which further breeds frustration and political protest.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
立陶宛
自20世纪90年代初以来,立陶宛的竞选活动都是在欧洲-大西洋一体化(更具体地说,是在担心俄罗斯有害的地缘政治干预的背景下)和自由市场改革(换句话说,渴望融入欧洲市场并成为欧元区的一部分)的长期议会政党协议框架内进行的。政党之间在社会经济规模上的总体差距相当小,在政治精英中,亲西方的共识是显而易见的。在立陶宛没有真正的弃儿党。立陶宛社会本身并没有被深刻的社会政治分裂所破坏,它的种族、宗教或企业分歧并不尖锐。然而,选举的波动性很大,政党也很多。然而,立陶宛的政府相对稳定。部长政府模式在立陶宛根深蒂固。自2000年以来,日益不稳定的多党制要求联合政府建立在党际谈判的基础上。目前的趋势是“超大”内阁和盈余联盟。通常,公开的联合政府协议更像是谅解备忘录,而不是经过深思熟虑的针对特定政策议程的伙伴关系文件。立陶宛的联盟容纳了寻求职位的政党和政治家。各党派对有关联盟的承诺通常通过部长职位的分配来维持。联盟管理机制产生人格化的迁就、可疑的妥协、延迟和推迟,作为解决冲突的典型模式。这些缺陷反过来导致政治问责制受到侵蚀,从而进一步滋生挫折感和政治抗议。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
Estonia Latvia Australia Conventional Signs and Abbreviations Belgium
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1