{"title":"Negotiation with incomplete information about worth: strict versus tolerant mechanisms","authors":"Gilad Zlotkin, J. Rosenschein","doi":"10.1109/ICICIS.1993.291749","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In the domain of distributed AI (DAI), two negotiation mechanisms (one strict and one tolerant), and a negotiation strategy, for the situation where agents' goals are common knowledge, but the worths they attach to those goals are private are presented. All possible prototypical classes of (non-conflict) encounters are analyzed, and it is shown where the strategy and mechanisms result in stable and/or efficient solutions. In most cases, the negotiation strategy is both stable and efficient. These are two situations in which the strategy, in combination with both mechanisms, results in a conflict (a non-efficient result). The reason for this inefficiency may be the failure to include conflict-resolution techniques. It is conjectured that enhancing the mechanisms with such techniques would result in a stable and efficient outcome in those two situations as well.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":270352,"journal":{"name":"[1993] Proceedings International Conference on Intelligent and Cooperative Information Systems","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1993-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"10","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"[1993] Proceedings International Conference on Intelligent and Cooperative Information Systems","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICICIS.1993.291749","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 10
Abstract
In the domain of distributed AI (DAI), two negotiation mechanisms (one strict and one tolerant), and a negotiation strategy, for the situation where agents' goals are common knowledge, but the worths they attach to those goals are private are presented. All possible prototypical classes of (non-conflict) encounters are analyzed, and it is shown where the strategy and mechanisms result in stable and/or efficient solutions. In most cases, the negotiation strategy is both stable and efficient. These are two situations in which the strategy, in combination with both mechanisms, results in a conflict (a non-efficient result). The reason for this inefficiency may be the failure to include conflict-resolution techniques. It is conjectured that enhancing the mechanisms with such techniques would result in a stable and efficient outcome in those two situations as well.<>