Decentralized Congestion Policies: Pricing Versus (Grandfathered) Slots in Airport Networks

Hao Lang
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Abstract

This dissertation consists of four related studies on the assessment of decentralized welfare-maximizing airport congestion policies involving (grandfathered) slot policy and pricing policy. Different demand structures and airport networks are considered in the presence of origin-destination passengers. These studies capture that local and non-local origin-destination passengers may have one or two destinations to choose from, in which the two destinations may or may not be considered as substitutes. This dissertation shows that even a small variation can fundamentally change the analysis and the assessment of the congestion policies.

The first study considers networks with two or three airports. The results show that equilibrium policies involve slots when airport profits do not matter and pricing policies when airport profits matter. The main results show that in the presence of congestion effects, equilibrium slot policies will lead to too high and equilibrium pricing policies to too low passenger quantities relative to the first best outcome that maximizes the welfare of all airport regions.

The second study considers a stylized airport network with two airports designed to clearly identify the role of local and non-local passengers. The analysis shows that the local welfare-maximizing slot quantity can coincide with the first-best outcome whereas this is impossible in the case of pricing policy. Whether the outcomes coincide in the case of slot policy depends on the shares of inframarginal and marginal local and non-local passengers. The results provide clear insights on the reasons why slot quantities are found to be excessive in the three-airport network considered in the first study.

The third study is an extension of the analysis of the three-airport network considered in the first study. This extension involves a variation of the demand structure in the sense that the air services offered at the congested airports are considered as imperfect substitutes whereas they are not considered as substitutes in the first study. The analysis shows that the presence of substitute air services is a necessary condition for equilibrium slot quantities to reach the first-best outcome. The results derived from the second study help understand the reasons why equilibrium slot quantities can lead to first-best outcome. Whereas equilibrium pricing levels will always be too high relative to the first-best prices independent of the presence or absence of substitute air services.

By contrast with the third study, the fourth study proceeds with the consideration of substitute air services for non-local passengers in a three-airport network to concentrate on the role of airport competition. The results show that airport competition will lead to too low equilibrium slot quantities in the case of slot policies, or too low equilibrium prices in the case of pricing policies, to maximize the total welfare of the two congested airports. The results further show that slot policies can lead to first-best outcome that maximizes the total welfare of three airport regions. Whereas pricing policies are too strict with too high equilibrium prices relative to the first-best outcome.
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分散的拥塞政策:定价与机场网络中的(祖父)时段
本文对分散福利最大化机场拥堵政策的评估进行了四项相关研究,包括(祖父)时段政策和定价政策。不同的需求结构和机场网络考虑到存在的始发目的地旅客。这些研究发现,本地和非本地始发目的地乘客可能有一个或两个目的地可供选择,其中两个目的地可能被视为替代目的地,也可能不被视为替代目的地。本文的研究表明,即使是很小的变化也会从根本上改变拥堵策略的分析和评估。第一项研究考虑的是有两个或三个机场的网络。结果表明,当机场利润不重要时,均衡政策涉及机位;当机场利润重要时,均衡政策涉及定价政策。研究结果表明,在存在拥堵效应的情况下,相对于使所有机场区域福利最大化的第一最佳结果,均衡时段政策将导致客运量过高,均衡定价政策将导致客运量过低。第二项研究考虑了一个程式化的机场网络,其中有两个机场,旨在清楚地确定本地和非本地乘客的角色。分析表明,当地福利最大化的插槽数量可以与第一最佳结果重合,而在定价政策的情况下,这是不可能的。在时段政策的情况下,结果是否一致取决于超边际和边际本地和非本地乘客的份额。研究结果清楚地揭示了在第一项研究中发现的三机场网络中航段数量过多的原因。第三项研究是对第一项研究中考虑的三机场网络分析的延伸。这种扩展涉及到需求结构的变化,即在拥挤的机场提供的航空服务被认为是不完全替代品,而在第一次研究中它们没有被视为替代品。分析表明,替代航班的存在是均衡时隙数量达到最优结果的必要条件。第二项研究的结果有助于理解为什么均衡槽量会导致最佳结果。然而,相对于与替代航空服务存在与否无关的最佳价格而言,均衡定价水平总是过高。与第三项研究相比,第四项研究进一步考虑在三个机场网络中为非本地旅客提供替代航空服务,以集中研究机场竞争的作用。结果表明,机场竞争将导致在时段政策下的均衡时段数量过低,或在定价政策下的均衡价格过低,从而使两个拥挤机场的总福利最大化。结果进一步表明,时段政策可以产生最优结果,使三个机场区域的总福利最大化。而定价政策过于严格,相对于第一最佳结果的均衡价格过高。
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