{"title":"On the Taxing of Migrants’ Earnings While Retaining a Migrant Workforce","authors":"O. Stark, Wiktor Budziński","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3213248","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We study policies that are aimed at retaining a migrant workforce in a Gulf State while introducing a tax on migrant earnings. We single out Qatar as a case study. We consider two types of migrants: target migrants, and non-target migrants. If migrants are target migrants, we show that in order to neutralize the effect of a tax on their earnings, Qatar needs to extend the length of time migrants are allowed to stay. Such a scheme can work even when the migrants experience utility loss from staying longer in Qatar. If migrants are non-target migrants, we show that implementation of a lottery scheme in which the prizes are life-long residency in Qatar can “compensate” for the imposition of the tax. In both cases, we present numerical examples that illustrate the magnitudes involved.","PeriodicalId":399000,"journal":{"name":"AARN: Migration (Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"AARN: Migration (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3213248","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
We study policies that are aimed at retaining a migrant workforce in a Gulf State while introducing a tax on migrant earnings. We single out Qatar as a case study. We consider two types of migrants: target migrants, and non-target migrants. If migrants are target migrants, we show that in order to neutralize the effect of a tax on their earnings, Qatar needs to extend the length of time migrants are allowed to stay. Such a scheme can work even when the migrants experience utility loss from staying longer in Qatar. If migrants are non-target migrants, we show that implementation of a lottery scheme in which the prizes are life-long residency in Qatar can “compensate” for the imposition of the tax. In both cases, we present numerical examples that illustrate the magnitudes involved.