{"title":"ORIGINALISM, RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS","authors":"Roberto Parra Dorantes","doi":"10.26520/ijtps.2020.4.6.43-53","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I shall defend a moderate version of original meaning originalism in constitutional interpretation. First, I will explain some relevant distinctions and qualifications related to originalism and to the specific version of the theory of constitutional interpretation which I will present here. Next, I will briefly compare this version of originalism with the view traditionally regarded as originalism’s natural opponent, the doctrine of the living Constitution, and I will argue that these two views are in fact compatible with each other once certain reasonable qualifications have been made to both of them. I shall then offer arguments in favor of the version of originalism presented here, which mainly have to do with the relation between a democratic system under a written constitution and the concepts of the rule of law and human rights. Finally, I will defend this version of originalism against views that hold that, in certain constitutional cases, once the original meaning of the Constitution, so to speak, “runs out”, non-originalist methods should be employed to reach a legal solution.","PeriodicalId":150920,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Theology, Philosophy and Science","volume":"76 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Journal of Theology, Philosophy and Science","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.26520/ijtps.2020.4.6.43-53","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In this paper I shall defend a moderate version of original meaning originalism in constitutional interpretation. First, I will explain some relevant distinctions and qualifications related to originalism and to the specific version of the theory of constitutional interpretation which I will present here. Next, I will briefly compare this version of originalism with the view traditionally regarded as originalism’s natural opponent, the doctrine of the living Constitution, and I will argue that these two views are in fact compatible with each other once certain reasonable qualifications have been made to both of them. I shall then offer arguments in favor of the version of originalism presented here, which mainly have to do with the relation between a democratic system under a written constitution and the concepts of the rule of law and human rights. Finally, I will defend this version of originalism against views that hold that, in certain constitutional cases, once the original meaning of the Constitution, so to speak, “runs out”, non-originalist methods should be employed to reach a legal solution.