An electric fence for kernel buffers

N. Joukov, A. Kashyap, Gopalan Sivathanu, E. Zadok
{"title":"An electric fence for kernel buffers","authors":"N. Joukov, A. Kashyap, Gopalan Sivathanu, E. Zadok","doi":"10.1145/1103780.1103786","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Improper access of data buffers is one of the most common errors in programs written in assembler, C, C++, and several other languages. Existing programs and OSs frequently access the data beyond the allocated buffers or access buffers that were already freed. Such programs and OSs may run for years before their problems can be detected because improper memory accesses frequently result in a silent data corruption. Not surprisingly, most computer worms exploit buffer overflow errors to gain complete control over computer systems. Only after recent worm epidemics, did code developers begin to realize the scale of the problem and the number of potential memory-access violations in existing code.Due to the syntax and flexibility of many programming languages, memory access violation problems cannot be detected at compile time. Tools that verify correctness before every memory access impose unacceptably high overheads. As a result, most of the developed techniques focus on preventing the hijacking of control by hackers and worms due to stack overflows. Consequently, hidden data corruption is given less attention.Memory access violations can be efficiently detected using the hardware support of the paging and virtual memory.Kefence is the general run-time solution we developed that allows to detect and avoid in-kernel overflow, underflow, and stale access problems for internal kernel buffers. Kefence is especially applicable to file system code because file systems operate at a high level of abstraction and require no direct access to the physical memory. At the same time, file systems use a large number of kernel buffers and file system errors are most harmful for users because users' persistent data can be corrupted.","PeriodicalId":413919,"journal":{"name":"ACM International Workshop on Storage Security And Survivability","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2005-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ACM International Workshop on Storage Security And Survivability","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1103780.1103786","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4

Abstract

Improper access of data buffers is one of the most common errors in programs written in assembler, C, C++, and several other languages. Existing programs and OSs frequently access the data beyond the allocated buffers or access buffers that were already freed. Such programs and OSs may run for years before their problems can be detected because improper memory accesses frequently result in a silent data corruption. Not surprisingly, most computer worms exploit buffer overflow errors to gain complete control over computer systems. Only after recent worm epidemics, did code developers begin to realize the scale of the problem and the number of potential memory-access violations in existing code.Due to the syntax and flexibility of many programming languages, memory access violation problems cannot be detected at compile time. Tools that verify correctness before every memory access impose unacceptably high overheads. As a result, most of the developed techniques focus on preventing the hijacking of control by hackers and worms due to stack overflows. Consequently, hidden data corruption is given less attention.Memory access violations can be efficiently detected using the hardware support of the paging and virtual memory.Kefence is the general run-time solution we developed that allows to detect and avoid in-kernel overflow, underflow, and stale access problems for internal kernel buffers. Kefence is especially applicable to file system code because file systems operate at a high level of abstraction and require no direct access to the physical memory. At the same time, file systems use a large number of kernel buffers and file system errors are most harmful for users because users' persistent data can be corrupted.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
内核缓冲区的电栅栏
对数据缓冲区的不正确访问是用汇编、C、c++和其他几种语言编写的程序中最常见的错误之一。现有的程序和操作系统经常访问超出已分配缓冲区或已经释放的访问缓冲区的数据。这样的程序和操作系统可能会运行数年才会发现问题,因为不适当的内存访问经常会导致无声的数据损坏。毫不奇怪,大多数计算机蠕虫利用缓冲区溢出错误来获得对计算机系统的完全控制。只是在最近的蠕虫流行之后,代码开发人员才开始意识到问题的规模和现有代码中潜在的内存访问违规的数量。由于许多编程语言的语法和灵活性,在编译时无法检测到内存访问冲突问题。在每次内存访问之前验证正确性的工具会带来不可接受的高开销。因此,大多数开发的技术都集中在防止由于堆栈溢出而被黑客和蠕虫劫持控制上。因此,隐藏的数据损坏被给予较少的关注。使用分页和虚拟内存的硬件支持,可以有效地检测内存访问违规。Kefence是我们开发的通用运行时解决方案,它允许检测和避免内核内溢出、下溢和内部内核缓冲区的过时访问问题。Kefence特别适用于文件系统代码,因为文件系统在高抽象级别上操作,不需要直接访问物理内存。同时,文件系统使用了大量的内核缓冲区,文件系统错误对用户的危害最大,因为用户的持久数据可能会被破坏。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
Secure data deduplication Improving secure long-term archival of digitally signed documents Efficient integrity checking of untrusted network storage Testable commitments When cryptography meets storage
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1