L. Sauvage, S. Guilley, J. Danger, N. Homma, Y. Hayashi
{"title":"A fault model for conducted intentional electromagnetic interferences","authors":"L. Sauvage, S. Guilley, J. Danger, N. Homma, Y. Hayashi","doi":"10.1109/ISEMC.2012.6351664","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Experimental setups used in electromagnetic compatibility tests can be used as platforms for fault injections. Faulting an equipment is a mean for a malevolent attacker to extract secret information. Compared to other fault injection setups, those based on EMC tests provide three advantages: non-invasivity, absence of synchronization, and frequency selectivity. This injection technique therefore allows the attacker to perform analysis with little knowledge of the targeted equipment. To assess the potential of this attack, a characterization of its effects is needed. This is the purpose of this paper. More precisely, our contributions are twofold: First of all, we observe that the faults are reproducible. Second, we show that the fault model is compatible with known attacks.","PeriodicalId":197346,"journal":{"name":"2012 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2012-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2012 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ISEMC.2012.6351664","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Abstract
Experimental setups used in electromagnetic compatibility tests can be used as platforms for fault injections. Faulting an equipment is a mean for a malevolent attacker to extract secret information. Compared to other fault injection setups, those based on EMC tests provide three advantages: non-invasivity, absence of synchronization, and frequency selectivity. This injection technique therefore allows the attacker to perform analysis with little knowledge of the targeted equipment. To assess the potential of this attack, a characterization of its effects is needed. This is the purpose of this paper. More precisely, our contributions are twofold: First of all, we observe that the faults are reproducible. Second, we show that the fault model is compatible with known attacks.