13. A matter perspective: Of transfers, switching, and cross-cutting legal procedures

Abstract

Thediscussion about legal pluralism is often framed by the state’s perspective. From this point of view, the state is in the centre and has to deal with the ‘problem’ of other legal systems, often subsumed under the generalizing term ‘customary law’ (e.g. Donovan and Getachew 2003:505), acting in ‘its realm’ (Griffiths 1986:1–7). Yet, these non-state legal systems often preceded state law historically, and may represent locally the legitimate heir of a legal tradition that used to be termed not ‘customary law’ but simply ‘the law’. Looking from the perspective of a local elder, senior lineage representative or individual affected by an on-going case rather than that of the court judge, advocate or government agent, state law may not be the primary focus or obvious choice for appeals; rather it represents one of several options or procedural variants ‘out there’ in an arena comprising both diverse regional institutions and authorities created by strangers (see Larcom 2013:205). So, when it comes to conceptions of the legal spheres, we always need to ask through whose eyes are they being perceived. Such an understanding also implies that state law cannot be taken to be the sole reference point for defining legal pluralism. In fact, legal pluralism is more than a binary situation of ‘state versus custom’ since there is rarely just one ‘custom’ at work, particularly in inter-ethnic settings and in settings comprising different religious traditions (see Pankhurst and Getachew 2008). Instead, there is a complex