Competing Auctions

D. Fudenberg, Glenn Ellison
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引用次数: 141

Abstract

This paper studies the conditions under which two competing and otherwise identical markets or auction sites of different sizes can coexist in equilibrium, without the larger one attracting all of the smaller one's patrons. We find that the range of equilibrium market sizes depends on the aggregate buyer-seller ratio, and also whether the markets are especially "thin."
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竞争拍卖
本文研究了两个不同规模的竞争市场或拍卖网站能够均衡共存的条件,其中较大的市场或拍卖网站不吸引所有较小的市场或拍卖网站的顾客。我们发现均衡市场规模的范围取决于总买卖比,也取决于市场是否特别“薄”。
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