Corporate Governance for Complex Cryptocurrencies?

Philip Hacker
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

Cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin or Ethereum are gaining ground not only as alternative modes of payment but also as platforms for financial innovation, particularly through token sales or initial coin offerings (‘ICOs’). All of these ventures are based on decentralized, permissionless blockchain technology, distinguished by their openness to, and the formal equality of, participants. However, recent cryptocurrency crises have shown that these architectures lack robust governance frameworks and are therefore prone to patterns of re-centralization. They are informally dominated by coalitions of powerful players within the cryptocurrency ecosystem who may violate basic rules of the blockchain community without accountability or sanction. This chapter first suggests that cryptocurrency and token-based ecosystems can be fruitfully analysed as complex systems that have been studied for decades in complexity theory and have recently gained prominence in financial regulation, too. It applies these insights to three key case studies: the Bitcoin Hard Fork of 2013; the Ethereum hard fork of 2016, following the DAO hack; and the ongoing Bitcoin scaling debate. Second, the chapter argues that complexity-induced uncertainty can be reduced, and elements of stability and order strengthened, by adapting a corporate governance framework to blockchain-based organizations: cryptocurrencies, and decentralized applications built on top of them via token sales. The resulting ‘comply-or-explain’ approach combines transparency and accountability with the necessary flexibility that allows blockchain developers to continue to experiment for the sake of innovation. Eventually, however, the coordination of these activities may necessitate the establishment of a self-regulatory institution.
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复杂加密货币的公司治理?
比特币或以太坊等加密货币不仅作为替代支付方式,而且作为金融创新的平台,特别是通过代币销售或首次代币发行(ICOs),正在取得进展。所有这些企业都基于去中心化、无需许可的区块链技术,其特点是对参与者的开放性和形式上的平等。然而,最近的加密货币危机表明,这些架构缺乏强大的治理框架,因此容易出现重新集中的模式。它们非正式地由加密货币生态系统中强大的参与者联盟主导,这些参与者可能违反区块链社区的基本规则而不受问责或制裁。本章首先表明,加密货币和基于代币的生态系统可以作为复杂系统进行富有成效的分析,这些系统在复杂性理论中已经研究了几十年,最近在金融监管中也获得了突出地位。它将这些见解应用于三个关键案例研究:2013年的比特币硬分叉;2016年的以太坊硬分叉,紧随DAO黑客事件;以及正在进行的比特币扩容辩论。其次,本章认为,通过将公司治理框架适用于基于区块链的组织:加密货币,以及通过代币销售建立在其之上的去中心化应用程序,可以减少复杂性引起的不确定性,并加强稳定和秩序的要素。由此产生的“服从或解释”方法将透明度和问责制与必要的灵活性相结合,使区块链开发人员能够为了创新而继续进行实验。然而,这些活动的协调最终可能需要建立一个自我管理的机构。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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