Gettier Sorunu: Fârâbî’nin Epistemik Seviyeleri Ekseninde Bir İnceleme

Muhammed Haksever
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Abstract

In the history of philosophy, knowledge has been defined in the traditional sense since Plato as justified true belief. Despite the dominance of this definition in epistemology, the adequacy of the make up definitive knowledge has been opposed and questioned. One of those who oppose the definition is Edmund L. Gettier (d. 2021), and the issue he posed known as the Gettier Problem, which is one of the most serious objections to the Platonic definition of knowledge. Gettier attempted to prove his idea that justified true belief could not create knowledge in people, asserting that some elements of luck could also contribute. Gettier showed that some wrong justifications can lead to a proposition that is actually true. In this sense, he expressed through examples that the components that constitute knowledge such as justification, truth, and belief, are insufficient. Meanwhile, Fârâbî (d. 339/950) showed in his works that it is possible to reach precise knowledge, especially in his Şerâ ʾ i ṭ u’l-ya ḳ în . As a matter of fact, the concept that Fârâbî used for certain knowledge is certitude (yakîn ), and that the epistemic level of knowledge is formed and the degree of certainty can be determined to the extent that the elements constituting the knowledge are fulfilled. In this regard, yakîn in the context of justified true belief constitutes the highest epistemic level. This study aimed to analyze the problem that Gettier attempted to prove in terms of Fârâbî’s perception. Among the elements of certain knowledge is the epistemic luck factor, which Gettier draws attention to, which was examined in what way it had a position in Fârâbî’s philosophy and how it is taken out of the definition. Based on this, the claims and criticisms put forward by Gettier were examined to determine where Fârâbî falls within Gettier’s understanding of knowledge. Also, Gettier’s objections to the Platonic definition of knowledge were determined through Fârâbî’s understanding of yakîn .
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在哲学史上,自柏拉图以来,知识在传统意义上一直被定义为被证实的真实信仰。尽管这一定义在认识论中占主导地位,但构成决定性知识的充分性一直受到反对和质疑。反对这一定义的人之一是埃德蒙·l·格蒂埃(Edmund L. Gettier,生于2021年),他提出的问题被称为“格蒂埃问题”,这是对柏拉图式知识定义的最严重反对之一。格蒂埃试图证明他的观点,即正当的真实信仰不能在人们身上创造知识,他断言运气的某些因素也可能起作用。Gettier证明了一些错误的论证可以导致一个命题实际上是真的。从这个意义上说,他通过例子表达了构成知识的要素,如证明、真理和信仰,是不够的。同时,Fârâbî(公元339/950年)在他的著作中表明,获得精确的知识是可能的,特别是在他的著作Şerâ中。事实上,Fârâbî对于某种知识所使用的概念是确定性(yakn),知识的认识水平的形成和确定性的程度取决于构成知识的要素得到满足的程度。在这方面,在正当的真实信念的背景下,yakn构成了最高的认知水平。本研究旨在从Fârâbî的感知角度分析Gettier试图证明的问题。在确定知识的要素中,有一个是认知运气因素,这是Gettier所关注的,他考察了它在Fârâbî哲学中的地位,以及它是如何从定义中被提取出来的。在此基础上,我们考察了格蒂埃提出的主张和批评,以确定Fârâbî属于格蒂埃对知识的理解。同时,通过Fârâbî对yakn的理解,确定了Gettier对柏拉图式知识定义的反对。
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