{"title":"Intelligence gathering, issues of accountability, and Snowden","authors":"J. Richards","doi":"10.4324/9780429399046-3","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We could ask the question as to whether Snowden’s actions, which place \nhim in exile in Russia facing multiple years in jail should he return to the US, \ncaused a retrenchment of industrial-scale Western surveillance and interception activities. The answer, perhaps ironically, is that the opposite seems to \nhave happened. Taking the UK’s IPA as an example, many Western states \ncontinue to have considerable interception capabilities and powers and have \narguably deepened and strengthened these powers in many cases. Indeed, it \ncould be argued that the state’s professed need to continue to be able to tackle \nthe security threats of the twenty-first century despite significant changes in \ntechnology have won out over any public concerns that may exist about erosions of privacy. As a side issue, continuing questions about whether Western \noversight and accountability regimes have sufficient teeth to be able to take on \nthe security agencies seem only to have been exacerbated. \nThis chapter will consider the chronology of events in the UK case study, \nstarting in the late 2000s and moving on to the passing of the IPA in 2016. \nIt interprets this story in terms of whether and how the state interacted with \nits critics in developing a refreshed surveillance regime; how the oversight \nbodies fared throughout the period; and where this leaves questions of \nprivacy-versus-security in the final analysis.","PeriodicalId":119561,"journal":{"name":"Terrorism and State Surveillance of Communications","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-05-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Terrorism and State Surveillance of Communications","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429399046-3","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Abstract
We could ask the question as to whether Snowden’s actions, which place
him in exile in Russia facing multiple years in jail should he return to the US,
caused a retrenchment of industrial-scale Western surveillance and interception activities. The answer, perhaps ironically, is that the opposite seems to
have happened. Taking the UK’s IPA as an example, many Western states
continue to have considerable interception capabilities and powers and have
arguably deepened and strengthened these powers in many cases. Indeed, it
could be argued that the state’s professed need to continue to be able to tackle
the security threats of the twenty-first century despite significant changes in
technology have won out over any public concerns that may exist about erosions of privacy. As a side issue, continuing questions about whether Western
oversight and accountability regimes have sufficient teeth to be able to take on
the security agencies seem only to have been exacerbated.
This chapter will consider the chronology of events in the UK case study,
starting in the late 2000s and moving on to the passing of the IPA in 2016.
It interprets this story in terms of whether and how the state interacted with
its critics in developing a refreshed surveillance regime; how the oversight
bodies fared throughout the period; and where this leaves questions of
privacy-versus-security in the final analysis.