Verdighet og selvbestemmelse – En aktørbasert forestilling om menneskeverdet

Abstract

Dignity, according to one conception, is the absolute, inherent and inalienable value of every person. There is general agreement that this idea of dignity has a source in Immanuel Kant’s moral philosophy. I argue that Kant formulates what I characterize as an agency or agent based conception of dignity. Persons are bearers of dignity in their capacity as moral subjects and subjects of action. Central here is the idea that a rational agent is the subject of “any end whatsoever” and so must be considered the free cause of actions. Accordingly, to be treated merely as a thing, or “as a means”, is to be treated in a manner incompatible with having and acting for the sake of any end of one’s choosing. Also relevant in this connection is Alan Gewirth’s agency based theories of dignity and of human rights. I then consider this conception of dignity in addressing three ethical issues: to let die or keep alive, assisted suicide, and so-called dwarf-tossing. Finally, I consider challenges to the idea of dignity in general and the agency based conception of dignity in particular.