{"title":"Adaptive Cyber Security for Critical Infrastructure","authors":"Emmanouil Samanis, Joseph Gardiner, A. Rashid","doi":"10.1109/iccps54341.2022.00043","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In the modern era, much of worldwide critical operations from a variety of different sectors are managed by industrial control systems (ICS). A typical ICS includes an extensive range of comput-erized devices, control systems, and networking appliances used to manage efficiently an industrial process across large geographical areas. ICS underpin sensitive and critical national infrastructures such as water treatment and energy production and transportation. The consequences of a successful attack against them can lead to shutting the infrastructure down which has major impacts such as production stoppages or safety implications for people, the environment, and assets. At the same time, running a process while the infrastructure is under attack or compromised also has safety im-plications, potentially catastrophic. This work-in-progress focuses on an adaptive approach, able to alter the defensive posture while providing assurances about operational capacity (or downgrading it) and safety. Our approach involves transforming policies from simply a means to enforce security requirements defined a priori, to adaptive objects that are capable to evolve in response to unfolding attacks. We use a case study of reconnaissance attacks and moving target defense as a means to realize such adaptive security policies.","PeriodicalId":340078,"journal":{"name":"2022 ACM/IEEE 13th International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems (ICCPS)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"5","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2022 ACM/IEEE 13th International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems (ICCPS)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/iccps54341.2022.00043","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Abstract
In the modern era, much of worldwide critical operations from a variety of different sectors are managed by industrial control systems (ICS). A typical ICS includes an extensive range of comput-erized devices, control systems, and networking appliances used to manage efficiently an industrial process across large geographical areas. ICS underpin sensitive and critical national infrastructures such as water treatment and energy production and transportation. The consequences of a successful attack against them can lead to shutting the infrastructure down which has major impacts such as production stoppages or safety implications for people, the environment, and assets. At the same time, running a process while the infrastructure is under attack or compromised also has safety im-plications, potentially catastrophic. This work-in-progress focuses on an adaptive approach, able to alter the defensive posture while providing assurances about operational capacity (or downgrading it) and safety. Our approach involves transforming policies from simply a means to enforce security requirements defined a priori, to adaptive objects that are capable to evolve in response to unfolding attacks. We use a case study of reconnaissance attacks and moving target defense as a means to realize such adaptive security policies.