From Wired to Wireless: Challenges of False Data Injection Attacks Against Smart Grid Sensor Networks

Abstract

Existing studies on False Data Injection Attacks (FDIAs), a type of stealth attacks against power grids aimed at compromising the system cyber-physical security, have primarily been conducted on wired systems in which state estimation is represented by overdetermined DC power flow models. The emerging trend of Smart Grid (SG) assisted by the widespread deployment of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) for various new functionalities, on the other hand, calls for a review of how some certain well-established premises need to be adjusted in the new context. In addition to related studies based on traditional bus-based systems, certain broad changes brought by the use of WSNs in grid systems will be introduced in this paper. Subsequently, differences in terms of bad data detection (BDD), false data injection attack strategy or physical feasibility of attack methods caused by the shift of scenario will be compared and briefly analyzed. A summary of new or previously overlooked requirements for FDIA studies will then be appended. By presenting a comprehensive review of related studies we will shed light on potential future research directions.