{"title":"Preference-constrained Oriented Matching","authors":"L. Fleischer, Zoya Svitkina","doi":"10.1137/1.9781611973006.9","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We introduce and study a combinatorial problem called preference-constrained oriented matching. This problem is defined on a directed graph in which each node has preferences over its out-neighbors, and the goal is to find a maximum-size matching on this graph that satisfies a certain preference constraint. One of our main results is a structural theorem showing that if the given graph is complete, then for any preference ordering there always exists a feasible matching that covers a constant fraction of the nodes. This result allows us to correct an error in a proof by Azar, Jain, and Mirrokni [1], establishing a lower bound on the price of anarchy in coordination mechanisms for scheduling. We also show that the preference-constrained oriented matching problem is APX-hard and give a constant-factor approximation algorithm for it.","PeriodicalId":340112,"journal":{"name":"Workshop on Analytic Algorithmics and Combinatorics","volume":"74 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2010-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"14","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Workshop on Analytic Algorithmics and Combinatorics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611973006.9","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 14
Abstract
We introduce and study a combinatorial problem called preference-constrained oriented matching. This problem is defined on a directed graph in which each node has preferences over its out-neighbors, and the goal is to find a maximum-size matching on this graph that satisfies a certain preference constraint. One of our main results is a structural theorem showing that if the given graph is complete, then for any preference ordering there always exists a feasible matching that covers a constant fraction of the nodes. This result allows us to correct an error in a proof by Azar, Jain, and Mirrokni [1], establishing a lower bound on the price of anarchy in coordination mechanisms for scheduling. We also show that the preference-constrained oriented matching problem is APX-hard and give a constant-factor approximation algorithm for it.