Democratization and Clientelism: Why are Young Democracies Badly Governed?

Philip Keefer
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引用次数: 119

Abstract

This paper identifies systematic performance differences between younger and older democracies: younger democracies are more corrupt; exhibit less rule of law, lower levels of bureaucratic quality, and lower secondary school enrollments; and spend more on public investment and government workers. Only one theory explains the effects of democratic age on the wide range of policy outcomes examined here-the inability of political competitors in younger democracies to make credible promises to citizens. This explanation, first advanced in Keefer and Vlaicu (2004), offers a concrete interpretation of what political institutionalization might mean, and why it is that young democracies frequently fail to become older and well-performing democracies. A variety of tests support this explanation against alternatives. The effect of democratic age remains large even after controlling for the possibilities that voters are less well-informed in young democracies, that young democracies have systematically different political and electoral institutions, or that young democracies exhibit more polarized societies.
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民主化与庇护主义:为什么年轻的民主国家治理不善?
本文确定了较年轻和较老民主国家之间的系统性表现差异:较年轻的民主国家更腐败;法治程度较低,官僚质量水平较低,中学入学率较低;在公共投资和政府工作人员上花更多的钱。只有一种理论可以解释民主年龄对本文所考察的广泛政策结果的影响——年轻民主国家的政治竞争者无力向公民做出可信的承诺。这一解释首先在Keefer和Vlaicu(2004)中提出,它对政治制度化可能意味着什么,以及为什么年轻的民主国家经常无法成为历史悠久、表现良好的民主国家提供了具体的解释。各种各样的测试都支持这种解释,而不是其他的解释。民主年龄的影响仍然很大,即使在控制了以下可能性之后:年轻的民主国家的选民不太了解情况,年轻的民主国家有系统不同的政治和选举机构,或者年轻的民主国家表现出更两极化的社会。
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