The Auditor-Valuation Specialist Coopetitive Alliance in the Fair Value Audit of Complex Financial Instruments

Dereck Barr‐Pulliam, Jennifer R. Joe, Stephanie A. Mason, Kerri-Ann Sanderson
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引用次数: 7

Abstract

We analyze interviews with valuation specialists (specialists) employed by audit firms (in the Asia-Pacific region, Europe, and the U.S.) to understand how they work with auditors to evaluate the reasonableness of fair value measurements (FVMs) for financial instruments. The exponential growth of FVMs and complex estimates reported on financial statements requires that auditors increasingly rely on specialists to perform these evaluations. Informed by coo-petition theory from management and organizational science, we develop a framework to examine the tensions in the auditor-specialist alliance (the cooperative alliance) and how those tensions can impact FVM audit quality. Our framework considers five factors that contribute to tensions in the coopetitive alliance – organizational structure, economic independence and stressors, project goals, group identity, and knowledge sharing. We find that tensions around the economic independence of the specialist unit, auditor delays in engaging the specialist, and specialists’ perceptions that auditors do not respect their expertise and contribution to the FVM audit, lead specialists to distrust auditors and respond in ways that threaten audit quality. Further, we show that firm-level choices in the organizational structure and policy governing the use of specialists can impact the perceived quality of the specialist unit and the quality of audited FVMs. Our research complements recent studies examining the role of specialists in audit engagements with significant complex estimates and provides new insights to academics, regulators, and professionals.
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复杂金融工具公允价值审计中的审计师-估值专家合作联盟
我们分析了与审计公司(亚太地区、欧洲和美国)雇用的估值专家(专家)的访谈,以了解他们如何与审计师合作评估金融工具的公允价值计量(fvm)的合理性。fvm的指数增长和财务报表中报告的复杂估计要求审计师越来越依赖专家来执行这些评估。根据管理学和组织科学的合作请愿理论,我们开发了一个框架来检查审计师-专家联盟(合作联盟)中的紧张关系,以及这些紧张关系如何影响FVM审计质量。我们的框架考虑了导致合作联盟紧张的五个因素——组织结构、经济独立性和压力源、项目目标、群体认同和知识共享。我们发现,围绕专家单位经济独立性的紧张关系,审计师在聘请专家方面的延迟,以及专家认为审计师不尊重他们的专业知识和对FVM审计的贡献,导致专家不信任审计师,并以威胁审计质量的方式作出回应。此外,我们还表明,企业在组织结构和管理专家使用的政策方面的选择可以影响专家单位的感知质量和审计fvm的质量。我们的研究补充了最近关于专家在重大复杂估计审计业务中的作用的研究,并为学者、监管机构和专业人士提供了新的见解。
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