Analysts' Forecasts Following Forced CEO Changes

Ka Wai Choi, Charlene Chen, Sue Wright, Hai Wu
{"title":"Analysts' Forecasts Following Forced CEO Changes","authors":"Ka Wai Choi, Charlene Chen, Sue Wright, Hai Wu","doi":"10.1111/abac.12026","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"type=\"main\"> This paper examines analysts' earnings forecasts during the period of uncertainty following a change of chief executive officer (CEO). It distinguishes between forced and non-forced CEO changes, and examines whether analysts utilize their information advantage to reduce the heightened uncertainty of a forced change of CEO. Examining a sample of Australian companies followed by analysts between 1999 and 2009, we find that forecasting accuracy is lower and earnings forecasts are more optimistic for firms experiencing forced CEO turnover compared to firms not undergoing such a change. However, dispersion is not statistically different. The results suggest that forced CEO turnover events provide a challenge to the forecasting environment for analysts. During CEO changes, investors should be aware that forecasts are less accurate and have an optimistic bias.","PeriodicalId":123337,"journal":{"name":"History of Accounting eJournal","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"9","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"History of Accounting eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/abac.12026","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9

Abstract

type="main"> This paper examines analysts' earnings forecasts during the period of uncertainty following a change of chief executive officer (CEO). It distinguishes between forced and non-forced CEO changes, and examines whether analysts utilize their information advantage to reduce the heightened uncertainty of a forced change of CEO. Examining a sample of Australian companies followed by analysts between 1999 and 2009, we find that forecasting accuracy is lower and earnings forecasts are more optimistic for firms experiencing forced CEO turnover compared to firms not undergoing such a change. However, dispersion is not statistically different. The results suggest that forced CEO turnover events provide a challenge to the forecasting environment for analysts. During CEO changes, investors should be aware that forecasts are less accurate and have an optimistic bias.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
本文研究了在首席执行官(CEO)更换后的不确定时期内分析师的收益预测。它区分了被迫和非被迫的CEO更替,并检验了分析师是否利用他们的信息优势来降低CEO被迫更替带来的高度不确定性。通过分析1999年至2009年期间分析师跟踪的澳大利亚公司样本,我们发现,与没有经历这种变化的公司相比,经历强制CEO更替的公司的预测准确性较低,收益预测更为乐观。然而,离散度在统计上并无差异。结果表明,强迫CEO离职事件对分析师的预测环境提出了挑战。在CEO更替期间,投资者应该意识到预测不那么准确,而且会有乐观的偏见。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
Evolution of U.S. Regulation and the Standard-Setting Process for Financial Reporting: 1930s to the Present Learning to Disclose: Disclosure Dynamics in the 1890s Streetcar Industry Financial Reporting by Charities: Why Do Some Choose to Report Under a More Extensive Reporting Framework? What Makes Research Possible? The Management Studies Research Division at the London School of Economics How America was Tricked on Tax Policy: Secrets and Undisclosed Practices - Book Review.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1