Liu v. S.E.C.: Supreme Court’s narrowing of SEC disgorgement raises questions for insider trading cases

Allen R. Friedman, Dani R. James, Gary P. Naftalis, Paul H. Schoeman, C. H. Mechanick
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Purpose To analyze the U.S, Supreme Court’s decision in Liu v. S.E.C., 140 S. Ct. 1936 (2020) and its potential implications for insider trading cases. Design/Methodology/Approach Provides context on the history of disgorgement in SEC enforcement proceedings; discusses factual and procedural background underlying the Liu decision; summarizes the Court’s opinion and rationale, with a particular focus on the Court’s pronouncements regarding the permissible scope of SEC disgorgement as an equitable remedy; identifies and explores three possible issues in insider trading cases that may be affected by the Court’s narrowing of SEC disgorgement. Findings In Liu, the Supreme Court narrowed SEC disgorgement by stating that, as a general matter, SEC disgorgement is not permitted where: (1) the proceeds are not remitted to investors; (2) one defendant is made to disgorge profits that were received by someone else; or (3) the amount of disgorgement fails to deduct legitimate business expenses, in each case subject to possible exemptions as outlined by the Court. Practical implications This rule may call into question whether courts may: (a) order disgorgement against insider traders, given the difficulty of identifying investors who have been harmed; (b) order insider traders to disgorge profits earned by others on account of their violations; or (c) order insider traders to pay civil penalties under Section 21 A of the Exchange Act based on profits earned by others. Originality/Value Expert analysis and guidance from experienced securities enforcement lawyers with expertise in insider trading.
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刘诉证券交易委员会:最高法院对证券交易委员会管辖权的缩小为内幕交易案件提出了问题
目的分析美国最高法院在Liu v. S.E.C, 140 S. Ct. 1936(2020)一案中的判决及其对内幕交易案件的潜在影响。设计/方法/方法提供SEC执法程序中分类的历史背景;讨论刘案判决的事实和程序背景;总结了法院的意见和理由,特别侧重于法院关于证券交易委员会撤销作为一种公平救济的允许范围的声明;确定并探讨了内幕交易案件中可能受到法院缩小SEC分类范围影响的三个可能问题。在刘先生的裁决中,最高法院缩小了SEC的追缴范围,指出,作为一般事项,在以下情况下不允许SEC追缴:(1)收益未汇给投资者;(二)强迫一被告交出他人所得利益的;或(3)扣缴的金额未能扣除合法的业务费用,在每种情况下,均受法院概述的可能豁免的限制。这条规则可能会让人质疑法院是否可以:(a)鉴于难以确定受到损害的投资者,法院是否可以下令对内幕交易者进行追缴;(二)责令内幕交易者交出他人因其违法行为获得的利润;或(c)命令内幕交易者根据《交易法》第21a条根据他人赚取的利润支付民事罚款。原创性/价值专家分析和指导经验丰富的证券执法律师在内幕交易方面的专长。
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