Regulating Multisided Platforms? The Case Against Treating Platforms As Utilities

Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, Albert D. Metz
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Abstract

The bloom is off the Big Tech rose. It seems nearly the entire political spectrum is angry with Amazon, Google and Facebook for one reason or another. This has led to a great deal of discussion on whether and how to regulate (or even break up) these platforms, including whether they should be regulated as utilities. Over the last several years, if there is one issue which might support a somewhat broad political consensus it is the desire to regulate large internet platforms like Amazon, Google and Facebook. Our purpose with this article is simply to caution against some forms of regulatory treatment which emphasize the utility-like nature of large platforms. We choose the word “caution” because we are not necessarily arguing that such regulation is in all instances inappropriate or uncalled for. Instead, all we mean is that there are counterarguments which should be considered, and in this article we give voice to some of those arguments. The basic economic argument for utility-like regulation of internet platforms is that these platforms can become “natural monopolies” which tend to forestall competition. While there is merit to this argument, internet platforms have also been a source of tremendous innovation which in turn has allowed entrants to unseat what were once thought to be entrenched incumbents. Regulation risks quashing such innovation and harming consumer welfare. Furthermore, internet platforms, unlike traditional utilities, are sometimes amenable to multi-homing, meaning that customers of one platform may also choose to be customers of additional similar platforms. Multi-homing can be critical in enabling successful entry into the market. While examples of entry do not disprove the possibility of market power abuse by some platforms, they do remind us that the economics of platforms can be more complex and nuanced than the classical utility model would suggest.
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监管多边平台?反对将平台视为公用事业的案例
科技巨头的玫瑰已经开花了。似乎几乎整个政界都因为这样或那样的原因对亚马逊(Amazon)、b谷歌和Facebook感到愤怒。这引发了关于是否以及如何监管(甚至拆分)这些平台的大量讨论,包括它们是否应该作为公用事业进行监管。在过去的几年里,如果有一个问题可能会支持一个广泛的政治共识,那就是对亚马逊、b谷歌和Facebook等大型互联网平台进行监管的愿望。我们写这篇文章的目的仅仅是提醒大家警惕某些形式的监管处理,这些监管处理强调了大型平台的实用程序性质。我们之所以选择“谨慎”一词,是因为我们并不一定认为这种监管在所有情况下都是不恰当或不必要的。相反,我们的意思是,有一些相反的论点应该被考虑,在本文中,我们给出了其中的一些观点。支持对互联网平台进行类似公用事业的监管的基本经济学论据是,这些平台可能成为“自然垄断”,往往会阻碍竞争。尽管这种观点有一定道理,但互联网平台也一直是巨大创新的源泉,这反过来又让新进入者推翻了曾经被认为根深蒂固的在位者。监管有可能压制这种创新,损害消费者福利。此外,与传统的公用事业不同,互联网平台有时可以适应多归属,这意味着一个平台的客户也可以选择成为其他类似平台的客户。多重归巢对于成功进入市场至关重要。虽然进入的例子并不能反驳某些平台滥用市场力量的可能性,但它们确实提醒我们,平台的经济学可能比经典实用新型所暗示的更复杂、更微妙。
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