Towards Simultaneous Attacks on Multiple Cellular Networks

Abstract

Cellular network attack research has dramatically expanded its capabilities in the last decade, but threat models routinely assume an attacker who targets a single cell with a small number of moderately-priced software defined radios. In many settings, such as mass crowd surveillance, attackers seek to gain passive or active dominance over a given area that is virtually always served by multiple cells and network operators. To do so, the only method publicly available is to naively duplicate their hardware at extensive cost. This paper presents a preliminary analysis of the feasibility of using a single software defined radio to surveil multiple networks simultaneously. Our key insight is that an attacker is often interested in only a portion of transmissions in a cell, and by design cellular transmissions are rigidly and predictably scheduled. Our system, Intercellular, rapidly schedules a single radio to tune between cells, effectively multiplexing the downlink channels of cells together. We demonstrate that radio tuning time is quite low (around 100ms), radio clocks are sufficiently stable to skip synchronization when retuning, and that even when monitoring multiple cells a radio can quite accurately count the devices served by all cells under observation. In so doing, we open new research directions advancing the efficiency and broad applicability of cellular network attacks.