Authentication Bypass and Remote Escalated I/O Command Attacks

Ryan Grandgenett, W. Mahoney, R. Gandhi
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引用次数: 9

Abstract

The Common Industrial Protocol (CIP) is a widely used Open DeviceNet Vendors Association (ODVA) standard [14]. CIP is an application-level protocol for communication between components in an industrial control setting such as a Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) environment. We present exploits for authentication and privileged I/O in a CIP implementation. In particular, Allen Bradley's implementation of CIP communications between its programming software and Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) is the target of our exploits. Allen Bradley's RSLogix 5000 software supports programming and centralized monitoring of Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) from a desktop computer. In our test bed, ControlLogix EtherNet/IP Web Server Module (1756-EWEB) allows the PLC Module (5573-Logix) to be programmed, monitored and controlled by RSLogix 5000 over an Ethernet LAN. Our vulnerability discovery process included examination of CIP network traffic and reverse engineering the RSLogix 5000 software. Our findings have led to the discovery of several vulnerabilities in the protocol, including denial-of-service attacks, but more significantly and recently the creation of an authentication bypass and remote escalated privileged I/O command exploit. The exploit abuses RSLogix 5000's use of hard-coded credentials for outbound communication with other SCADA components. This paper provides a first public disclosure of the vulnerability, exploit development process, and results.
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认证绕过和远程升级I/O命令攻击
通用工业协议(CIP)是一种广泛使用的开放设备网络供应商协会(ODVA)标准[14]。CIP是一种应用级协议,用于工业控制设置(如监控和数据采集(SCADA)环境)中组件之间的通信。我们提出了一个CIP实现中的身份验证和特权I/O漏洞。特别是,Allen Bradley在其编程软件和可编程逻辑控制器(plc)之间实现CIP通信是我们利用的目标。Allen Bradley的RSLogix 5000软件支持从台式计算机对可编程逻辑控制器(plc)进行编程和集中监控。在我们的测试平台中,ControlLogix以太网/IP Web服务器模块(1756-EWEB)允许PLC模块(5573-Logix)通过以太网LAN由RSLogix 5000编程,监视和控制。我们的漏洞发现过程包括检查CIP网络流量和对RSLogix 5000软件进行逆向工程。我们的发现导致在协议中发现了几个漏洞,包括拒绝服务攻击,但更重要的是,最近创建了身份验证绕过和远程升级特权I/O命令利用。该漏洞滥用RSLogix 5000使用硬编码凭据与其他SCADA组件进行出站通信。本文首次公开了漏洞、开发过程和结果。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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