Price Discrimination by a Two-Sided Platform: With Applications to Advertising and Privacy Design

Doh-Shin Jeon, Byung-Cheol Kim, D. Menicucci
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Abstract

We study price discrimination by a monopoly two-sided platform who mediates interactions between two different groups of agents. We adapt a canonical model of second-degree price discrimination `a la Mussa and Rosen (1978) to a two-sided platform by focusing on non-responsiveness, a clash between the allocation the platform wants to achieve and the incentive compatible allocations. In this framework we address the key question of when a price discrimination on one side complements or substitutes a price discrimination on the other side. We offer two applications on advertising platforms and also highlight the role of commitment in eliciting personal information for targeted advertising.
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双边平台下的价格歧视:基于广告与隐私设计的应用
我们通过一个垄断的双边平台来研究价格歧视问题,该平台调解了两组不同的代理之间的互动。我们将Mussa和Rosen(1978)的二级价格歧视的标准模型改编为双边平台,通过关注非响应性,即平台想要实现的分配与激励兼容分配之间的冲突。在这个框架中,我们解决了一个关键问题,即一方的价格歧视何时补充或替代另一方的价格歧视。我们在广告平台上提供两种应用程序,并强调承诺在获取个人信息以进行定向广告方面的作用。
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