Forensic Attacks Analysis and the Cyber Security of Safety-Critical Industrial Control Systems

Chris W. Johnson, R. Harkness, Maria Evangelopoulou
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引用次数: 6

Abstract

Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) applications monitor and control a wide range of safety-related functions. These include energy generation, where failures could have significant, irreversible consequences. They also include the control systems that are used in the manufacture of safety-related products. In this case, “bugs” in an ICS/SCADA system could introduce flaws in the production of components; these flaws remain undetected before being incorporated into safety-related applications. Industrial Control Systems, typically, use devices and networks that are different from conventional IP-based infrastructures. These differences prevent the re-use of existing cyber-security products in ICS/SCADA environments; the architectures, file formats and process structures are all different. This paper supports the forensic analysis of industrial control systems in safety-related applications. In particular, we describe how forensic attack analysis is used to identify weaknesses in devices so that we can both protect components and determine the information that must be analyzed during the aftermath of a cyber-incident. Simulated attacks detect vulnerabilities; a risk-based approach can then be used to assess the likelihood and impact of any breach. These risk assessments are then used to justify both immediate and longer-term countermeasures.
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安全关键型工业控制系统的取证攻击分析和网络安全
工业控制系统(ICS)和监控与数据采集(SCADA)应用监控和控制广泛的安全相关功能。其中包括能源生产,其中的故障可能会产生严重的、不可逆转的后果。它们还包括用于制造安全相关产品的控制系统。在这种情况下,ICS/SCADA系统中的“bug”可能会在组件的生产中引入缺陷;这些缺陷在被纳入与安全相关的应用程序之前一直未被发现。工业控制系统通常使用与传统的基于ip的基础设施不同的设备和网络。这些差异阻止了现有网络安全产品在ICS/SCADA环境中的重复使用;体系结构、文件格式和进程结构都是不同的。本文支持安全相关应用中工业控制系统的取证分析。特别是,我们描述了如何使用取证攻击分析来识别设备中的弱点,以便我们既可以保护组件,又可以确定在网络事件发生后必须分析的信息。模拟攻击检测漏洞;然后可以使用基于风险的方法来评估任何违规行为的可能性和影响。然后,这些风险评估被用来证明当前和长期对策的合理性。
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