Problem „świadomości w ogóle” u Kanta i Jaspersa

Abstract

In his book on Kant, Jaspers equates consciousness-as-such with transcenden- tal apperception. Within the framework of Kantian philosophy, consciousness as transcendental apperception is treated as: (1) original synthetic unity, and (2) a form of consciousness or form of presentation. I first consider the con- nections between consciousness-as-such and the transcendental subject, the transcendental I and the noumenal I. I then turn to an analysis of Jaspers’ treatment of consciousness-as-such. He understands this term to mean “the encompassing that is the entity that I am (self)”. Consciousness-as-such is considered in two ways, i.e. through a description of (1) what it is in itself, and (2) its relationship with other kinds of encompassing. I limit my discussion to the relationship between consciousness and two main kinds of encompassing, that is Existenz and reason. I focus on the concept of consciousness from the following perspectives: (1) as a form, (2) the role of Existenz as a factor filling in the empty form of consciousness, and (3) as illuminating consciousness through reason.