Dominance as a New Trusted Computing Primitive for the Internet of Things

Meng Xu, Manuel Huber, Zhichuang Sun, P. England, Marcus Peinado, Sang-Ho Lee, A. Marochko, D. Mattoon, Rob Spiger, S. Thom
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引用次数: 37

Abstract

The Internet of Things (IoT) is rapidly emerging as one of the dominant computing paradigms of this decade. Applications range from in-home entertainment to large-scale industrial deployments such as controlling assembly lines and monitoring traffic. While IoT devices are in many respects similar to traditional computers, user expectations and deployment scenarios as well as cost and hardware constraints are sufficiently different to create new security challenges as well as new opportunities. This is especially true for large-scale IoT deployments in which a central entity deploys and controls a large number of IoT devices with minimal human interaction. Like traditional computers, IoT devices are subject to attack and compromise. Large IoT deployments consisting of many nearly identical devices are especially attractive targets. At the same time, recovery from root compromise by conventional means becomes costly and slow, even more so if the devices are dispersed over a large geographical area. In the worst case, technicians have to travel to all devices and manually recover them. Data center solutions such as the Intelligent Platform Management Interface (IPMI) which rely on separate service processors and network connections are not only not supported by existing IoT hardware, but are unlikely to be in the foreseeable future due to the cost constraints of mainstream IoT devices. This paper presents Cider, a system that can recover IoT devices within a short amount of time, even if attackers have taken root control of every device in a large deployment. The recovery requires minimal manual intervention. After the administrator has identified the compromise and produced an updated firmware image, he/she can instruct Cider to force the devices to reset and to install the patched firmware on the devices. We demonstrate the universality and practicality of Cider by implementing it on three popular IoT platforms (HummingBoard Edge, Raspberry Pi Compute Module 3 and Nucleo-L476RG) spanning the range from high to low end. Our evaluation shows that the performance overhead of Cider is generally negligible.
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优势作为一种新的物联网可信计算原语
物联网(IoT)正迅速成为这十年中占主导地位的计算范式之一。应用范围从家庭娱乐到大规模工业部署,如控制装配线和监控交通。虽然物联网设备在许多方面与传统计算机相似,但用户期望和部署场景以及成本和硬件限制的差异足以产生新的安全挑战和新的机遇。这对于大规模物联网部署尤其如此,在大规模物联网部署中,中央实体以最少的人工交互部署和控制大量物联网设备。与传统计算机一样,物联网设备也容易受到攻击和危害。由许多几乎相同的设备组成的大型物联网部署是特别有吸引力的目标。与此同时,通过传统手段从根损害中恢复变得既昂贵又缓慢,如果设备分散在一个大的地理区域,则更是如此。在最坏的情况下,技术人员必须前往所有设备并手动恢复它们。数据中心解决方案,如IPMI (Intelligent Platform Management Interface),依赖于独立的业务处理器和网络连接,不仅现有的物联网硬件不支持,而且由于主流物联网设备的成本限制,在可预见的未来也不太可能支持。本文介绍了Cider,一个可以在短时间内恢复物联网设备的系统,即使攻击者已经控制了大型部署中的每个设备。恢复需要最少的人工干预。在管理员识别出漏洞并生成更新的固件映像后,他/她可以指示Cider强制设备重置并在设备上安装补丁固件。我们通过在三个流行的物联网平台(HummingBoard Edge, Raspberry Pi Compute Module 3和Nucleo-L476RG)上实现它来展示Cider的通用性和实用性,涵盖从高端到低端的范围。我们的评估表明,Cider的性能开销通常可以忽略不计。
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