Conclusion

V. Houghton
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Abstract

Even the detonation of the first Soviet atomic bomb in August, 1949 did not convince most Americans to reconsider their perception of Soviet science. American scientific, military, and policymaking elite spread blame widely for the intelligence failure, but refused to acknowledge the possibility of Soviet scientific strength as the primary culprit. Instead, they latched onto ideas that mitigated the impact of Soviet scientific ability. While the rest of the American national security system was improving, the refusal to give Soviet science the credit where credit was due meant that the American scientific intelligence apparatus continued to falter well into the 1950s. The CIA’s Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) – which was explicitly created to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence concerning enemy scientific development – did not become an effective intelligence agency until the 1960s, despite the emerging Soviet atomic threat.
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结论
即使苏联在1949年8月引爆了第一颗原子弹,也没能说服大多数美国人重新考虑他们对苏联科学的看法。美国的科学、军事和决策精英们广泛指责情报失误,但拒绝承认苏联的科学实力可能是罪魁祸首。相反,他们抓住了减轻苏联科学能力影响的想法。当美国国家安全系统的其他部分正在改善时,拒绝给予苏联科学应得的荣誉意味着美国的科学情报机构在20世纪50年代继续摇摇欲坠。中央情报局的科学情报办公室(OSI)——明确是为了收集、分析和传播有关敌方科学发展的情报而设立的——直到20世纪60年代才成为一个有效的情报机构,尽管当时出现了苏联的原子威胁。
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