Critical Remarks on an Interpretation of Reid on Perceptual Apprehension

Abstract

I argue that Thomas Reid’s theory of perception can be defended against the charges of inconsistency levied against it by Nicholas Wolterstorff. The challenge to be met is roughly that of showing how the Reidian account of perception can avoid being hampered by a descriptive theory of mental reference for perceptual states. First, I will review Reid’s theory of perception and Wolterstorff’s objections to it. Wolterstorff maintains that Reid is committed to an account of perceptual reference according to which mental representations are conceptual intermediaries between the perceiver and the objects of perception. I hope in section III to show that the theory attributed to Reid is unworkable. In the remainder of the paper I will argue that Reid need not be committed to any such view. In sections V through IX, I will sketch an alternative account of perceptual reference that is immediate in the required sense and that can be incorporated into a Reidian account of perception. My proposal will depend crucially on David Kaplan’s account of demonstratives and on mobilizing Kaplan’s semantics for application to the case of perceptual content. J. W. Waldrop Calvin College jww24@students.calvin.edu https://doi.org/10.7710/2155-4838.1183 Volume 10, Issue 1 Res Cogitans 2 | eP1183 Res Cogitans According to Nicholas Wolterstorff,1 Thomas Reid’s theory of perception faces a problem of perceptual reference. Reid disavows the representational paradigm in the philosophy of mind and perception—the so-called Way of Ideas that he associates with modern authors including Descartes, Locke, Malebranche, Berkeley and Hume. According to proponents of the Way of Ideas, no one is ever in any sort of intimate, mental congress with the external world; the only things to which we bear any direct cognitive relation are ideas—an agent’s mental representations. A theory of de re perceptual states must include an account of perceptual reference—how a perceiver gets a mental or semantic grip on objects perceived. Wolterstorff claims that Reid’s theory of perception is insufficiently antirepresentational, owing to its reliance on phenomenal states to mediate perceptual reference.2 Wolterstorff’s claim is that Reid’s theory is not a theory of direct perception since, according to Wolterstorff, Reid is committed to a view of perceptual reference that is not conceptually immediate. First, I will review Reid’s theory of perception and Wolterstorff’s objections to it. I hope in section III to show that the theory Wolterstorff attributes to Reid is unworkable and in the remainder of the paper to show that Reid need not be committed to any such view. In sections V through IX, I will sketch an alternative account of perceptual reference that is immediate in the required sense and that can be incorporated into a Reidian account of perception. My proposal will depend crucially on David Kaplan’s account of demonstratives and on mobilizing Kaplan’s semantics for application to the case of perceptual content.