Data Recovery on Encrypted Databases with k-Nearest Neighbor Query Leakage

Evgenios M. Kornaropoulos, Charalampos Papamanthou, R. Tamassia
{"title":"Data Recovery on Encrypted Databases with k-Nearest Neighbor Query Leakage","authors":"Evgenios M. Kornaropoulos, Charalampos Papamanthou, R. Tamassia","doi":"10.1109/SP.2019.00015","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Recent works by Kellaris et al. (CCS’16) and Lacharite et al. (SP’18) demonstrated attacks of data recovery for encrypted databases that support rich queries such as range queries. In this paper, we develop the first data recovery attacks on encrypted databases supporting one-dimensional k-nearest neighbor (k-NN) queries, which are widely used in spatial data management. Our attacks exploit a generic k-NN query leakage profile: the attacker observes the identifiers of matched records. We consider both unordered responses, where the leakage is a set, and ordered responses, where the leakage is a k-tuple ordered by distance from the query point. As a first step, we perform a theoretical feasibility study on exact reconstruction, i.e., recovery of the exact plaintext values of the encrypted database. For ordered responses, we show that exact reconstruction is feasible if the attacker has additional access to some auxiliary information that is normally not available in practice. For unordered responses, we prove that exact reconstruction is impossible due to the infinite number of valid reconstructions. As a next step, we propose practical and more realistic approximate reconstruction attacks so as to recover an approximation of the plaintext values. For ordered responses, we show that after observing enough query responses, the attacker can approximate the client’s encrypted database with considerable accuracy. For unordered responses we characterize the set of valid reconstructions as a convex polytope in a k-dimensional space and present a rigorous attack that reconstructs the plaintext database with bounded approximation error. As multidimensional spatial data can be efficiently processed by mapping it to one dimension via Hilbert curves, we demonstrate our approximate reconstruction attacks on privacy-sensitive geolocation data. Our experiments on real-world datasets show that our attacks reconstruct the plaintext values with relative error ranging from 2.9% to 0.003%.","PeriodicalId":272713,"journal":{"name":"2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"65","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2019.00015","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 65

Abstract

Recent works by Kellaris et al. (CCS’16) and Lacharite et al. (SP’18) demonstrated attacks of data recovery for encrypted databases that support rich queries such as range queries. In this paper, we develop the first data recovery attacks on encrypted databases supporting one-dimensional k-nearest neighbor (k-NN) queries, which are widely used in spatial data management. Our attacks exploit a generic k-NN query leakage profile: the attacker observes the identifiers of matched records. We consider both unordered responses, where the leakage is a set, and ordered responses, where the leakage is a k-tuple ordered by distance from the query point. As a first step, we perform a theoretical feasibility study on exact reconstruction, i.e., recovery of the exact plaintext values of the encrypted database. For ordered responses, we show that exact reconstruction is feasible if the attacker has additional access to some auxiliary information that is normally not available in practice. For unordered responses, we prove that exact reconstruction is impossible due to the infinite number of valid reconstructions. As a next step, we propose practical and more realistic approximate reconstruction attacks so as to recover an approximation of the plaintext values. For ordered responses, we show that after observing enough query responses, the attacker can approximate the client’s encrypted database with considerable accuracy. For unordered responses we characterize the set of valid reconstructions as a convex polytope in a k-dimensional space and present a rigorous attack that reconstructs the plaintext database with bounded approximation error. As multidimensional spatial data can be efficiently processed by mapping it to one dimension via Hilbert curves, we demonstrate our approximate reconstruction attacks on privacy-sensitive geolocation data. Our experiments on real-world datasets show that our attacks reconstruct the plaintext values with relative error ranging from 2.9% to 0.003%.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
具有k近邻查询泄漏的加密数据库的数据恢复
Kellaris等人(CCS ' 16)和Lacharite等人(SP ' 18)最近的作品展示了支持丰富查询(如范围查询)的加密数据库的数据恢复攻击。本文首次对空间数据管理中广泛使用的支持一维k-最近邻(k-NN)查询的加密数据库进行了数据恢复攻击。我们的攻击利用了一个通用的k-NN查询泄漏配置文件:攻击者观察匹配记录的标识符。我们既考虑无序响应,其中泄漏是一个集合,也考虑有序响应,其中泄漏是一个k元组,按与查询点的距离排序。作为第一步,我们对精确重建进行了理论可行性研究,即恢复加密数据库的精确明文值。对于有序响应,我们表明,如果攻击者有额外的访问一些通常在实践中不可用的辅助信息,精确重构是可行的。对于无序响应,由于有效重构的数量是无限的,我们证明了精确重构是不可能的。下一步,我们提出了更实用、更真实的近似重建攻击,以恢复近似的明文值。对于有序响应,我们表明,在观察到足够的查询响应后,攻击者可以相当准确地近似客户端的加密数据库。对于无序响应,我们将有效重构集表征为k维空间中的凸多面体,并提出了一种具有有界近似误差的重构明文数据库的严格攻击。由于多维空间数据可以通过希尔伯特曲线映射到一维来有效地处理,我们展示了对隐私敏感的地理位置数据的近似重建攻击。我们在真实数据集上的实验表明,我们的攻击重建的明文值的相对误差在2.9%到0.003%之间。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
The 9 Lives of Bleichenbacher's CAT: New Cache ATtacks on TLS Implementations CaSym: Cache Aware Symbolic Execution for Side Channel Detection and Mitigation PrivKV: Key-Value Data Collection with Local Differential Privacy Postcards from the Post-HTTP World: Amplification of HTTPS Vulnerabilities in the Web Ecosystem New Primitives for Actively-Secure MPC over Rings with Applications to Private Machine Learning
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1