Uniform Pricing as a Barrier to Entry

Hong Feng, Youping Li, Jie Shuai
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Abstract

This paper considers an entry game in which an incumbent firm operates in a number of markets and a potential entrant seeks to enter some or all of the markets. While price discrimination has usually been thought of as a barrier to entry, in our model it is not and, on the contrary, we find that charging a uniform price across the markets actually discourages entry. Partial entry occurs when the two firms’ products are highly substitutable. In this case, a ban on price discrimination raises the profits of both the incumbent and the entrant but reduces consumer and total welfare.
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统一定价作为进入壁垒
本文考虑了一个进入博弈,在这个博弈中,既有企业在多个市场中运营,而潜在的进入者试图进入部分或全部市场。虽然价格歧视通常被认为是进入的障碍,但在我们的模型中并非如此,相反,我们发现在整个市场收取统一价格实际上阻碍了进入。当两家公司的产品具有高度可替代性时,就会出现部分进入。在这种情况下,禁止价格歧视提高了在位者和进入者的利润,但减少了消费者和总福利。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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