The rights of the defendant and public interest in proving insanity under the law of New York

Abstract

Allocation of the burden of proof is a key issue of criminal procedure that is affected by multiple legal and social factors. Under due process principles, the defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial is deemed to be the epicenter of the whole structure. However, efficient law enforcement is a prominent public interest that must be considered. This article explores the correlation between public and private interest in proving insanity under the law of New York, which provides great empirical background due to its long history of legal disputes and legislative changes. Considering the nature and structure of the burden of proof, the author concludes that there are several principles for its fair allocation: the due party that bears both the burden and the risk of its nonperformance; the feasibility of the burden; the adequate opportunity for the other party to rebut; the concentration of resources upon needs that are not presumed but in fact exist. All the mentioned principles lay the ground for the harmonization of constitutional guaranties for the defendant as well as the successful enforcement of criminal law. The current New York approach to insanity defense as an affirmative one along with the history of its implementation tends to prove its compliance with such requirements. This finding suggests that bearing the burden shall not be treated as impairment by default, but can protect both the interest of this party and the integrity of the whole process.