{"title":"Exemptions, Qualifications, Derogations, and Excuses in International Human Rights Law","authors":"K. Trapp","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198789321.003.0017","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"There is a broad spectrum of permissible qualifications to human rights in the interests of achieving a legitimate aim, and this chapter outlines a typology of qualifications and the interactions between them. This chapter argues that there is nothing inherent in the form relevant qualifications take—they may take the form of exemptions from the scope of the right, exceptions to the rights protection, or a temporally limited suspension of the obligation to respect the right or the secondary obligations which flow from responsibility for a breach. Indeed, the different qualifications overlap and the structure of analysis in respect of each can be relied on to inform the others’ application on the basis of principles of systemic interpretation. While the same legitimate aim can be addressed in the human rights calculus bearing on these qualifications, the key difference lies in the nature of judicial engagement with rights protection.","PeriodicalId":102121,"journal":{"name":"Exceptions in International Law","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Exceptions in International Law","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198789321.003.0017","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
There is a broad spectrum of permissible qualifications to human rights in the interests of achieving a legitimate aim, and this chapter outlines a typology of qualifications and the interactions between them. This chapter argues that there is nothing inherent in the form relevant qualifications take—they may take the form of exemptions from the scope of the right, exceptions to the rights protection, or a temporally limited suspension of the obligation to respect the right or the secondary obligations which flow from responsibility for a breach. Indeed, the different qualifications overlap and the structure of analysis in respect of each can be relied on to inform the others’ application on the basis of principles of systemic interpretation. While the same legitimate aim can be addressed in the human rights calculus bearing on these qualifications, the key difference lies in the nature of judicial engagement with rights protection.