Shengbao Zheng, Zhenyu Zhou, Heyi Tang, Xiaowei Yang
{"title":"SwitchMan: An Easy-to-Use Approach to Secure User Input and Output","authors":"Shengbao Zheng, Zhenyu Zhou, Heyi Tang, Xiaowei Yang","doi":"10.1109/SPW.2019.00029","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Modern operating systems for personal computers (including Linux, MAC, and Windows) provide user-level APIs for an application to access the I/O paths of another application. This design facilitates information sharing between applications, enabling applications such as screenshots. However, it also enables user-level malware to log a user's keystrokes or scrape a user's screen output. In this work, we explore a design called SwitchMan to protect a user's I/O paths against user-level malware attacks. SwitchMan assigns each user with two accounts: a regular one for normal operations and a protected one for inputting and outputting sensitive data. Each user account runs under a separate virtual terminal. Malware running under a user's regular account cannot access sensitive input/output under a user's protected account. At the heart of SwitchMan lies a secure protocol that enables automatic account switching when an application requires sensitive input/output from a user. Our performance evaluation shows that SwitchMan adds acceptable performance overhead. Our security and usability analysis suggests that SwitchMan achieves a better tradeoff between security and usability than existing solutions.","PeriodicalId":125351,"journal":{"name":"2019 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2019 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SPW.2019.00029","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Modern operating systems for personal computers (including Linux, MAC, and Windows) provide user-level APIs for an application to access the I/O paths of another application. This design facilitates information sharing between applications, enabling applications such as screenshots. However, it also enables user-level malware to log a user's keystrokes or scrape a user's screen output. In this work, we explore a design called SwitchMan to protect a user's I/O paths against user-level malware attacks. SwitchMan assigns each user with two accounts: a regular one for normal operations and a protected one for inputting and outputting sensitive data. Each user account runs under a separate virtual terminal. Malware running under a user's regular account cannot access sensitive input/output under a user's protected account. At the heart of SwitchMan lies a secure protocol that enables automatic account switching when an application requires sensitive input/output from a user. Our performance evaluation shows that SwitchMan adds acceptable performance overhead. Our security and usability analysis suggests that SwitchMan achieves a better tradeoff between security and usability than existing solutions.