How to Restructure Sovereign Debt: Lessons from Four Decades

L. Buchheit, G. Chabert, Chanda DeLong, Jeromin Zettelmeyer
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引用次数: 13

Abstract

This paper attempts to provide a playbook for the sovereign debt restructuring process, drawing on the experience with sovereign debt restructuring since the 1980s. It begins with a discussion of the participating actors and their interests. It then describes the considerations that must be weighed in designing, negotiating, and concluding a debt restructuring, in light of two problems: asymmetric information between the debtor and the creditors, and creditor coordination problems, which can lead to free riding (the “holdout” problem). The paper focuses on how these problems, which can lead to inefficiently negotiated outcomes, can be managed and minimized in practice.
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如何重组主权债务:40年的教训
本文试图借鉴20世纪80年代以来主权债务重组的经验,为主权债务重组过程提供一个剧本。它以讨论参与者及其利益开始。然后,它描述了在设计、谈判和完成债务重组时必须权衡的考虑因素,考虑到两个问题:债务人和债权人之间的信息不对称,以及债权人协调问题,这可能导致搭便车(“钉子户”问题)。本文的重点是如何在实践中管理和最小化这些可能导致低效谈判结果的问题。
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