Because I (Don’t) Deserve It: Entitlement and Lying Behavior

Tilman Fries, Daniel Parra
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

Abstract We study the effect of entitlement on the willingness to lie. We set up a model of lying where individuals feel more or less entitled to their endowment depending on how they earned it. When given the opportunity to lie to keep their endowment, individuals who feel more entitled are encouraged to lie while others are discouraged. To test the model predictions we use a laboratory experiment where we compare the lying behavior of participants endowed with a high endowment and participants endowed with a low endowment. In one treatment, the allocation of the endowment is decided by participants’ performance, and in the other, it is determined by a random draw. Our study shows that deservingness influences lying in an intuitive direction: when participants performance determines income, those who earn less money lie less than those who earn more. We do not find differences in lying when participants perform the same task but lie to keep windfall endowments.
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因为我(不)值得:权利和撒谎行为
摘要本文研究了权利对撒谎意愿的影响。我们建立了一个谎言模型,在这个模型中,个人认为自己或多或少有权获得他们的捐赠,这取决于他们是如何获得的。当有机会通过撒谎来保持他们的禀赋时,那些觉得自己更有资格的人会被鼓励撒谎,而其他人则会被劝阻。为了验证模型的预测,我们使用了一个实验室实验,在实验中,我们比较了禀赋高的参与者和禀赋低的参与者的撒谎行为。在一种情况下,捐赠的分配由参与者的表现决定,而在另一种情况下,捐赠的分配由随机抽签决定。我们的研究表明,应得性以一种直观的方式影响谎言:当参与者的表现决定收入时,挣得少的人比挣得多的人说谎少。当参与者完成同样的任务,但为了保留意外之财而撒谎时,我们没有发现撒谎的差异。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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