On Practical Threat Scenario Testing in an Electric Power ICS Testbed

Ahnaf Siddiqi, Nils Ole Tippenhauer, D. Mashima, Binbin Chen
{"title":"On Practical Threat Scenario Testing in an Electric Power ICS Testbed","authors":"Ahnaf Siddiqi, Nils Ole Tippenhauer, D. Mashima, Binbin Chen","doi":"10.1145/3198458.3198461","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Industrial control system networks in real world usually require a complex composition of many different devices, protocols, and services. Unfortunately, such practical setups are rarely documented publicly in sufficient technical detail to allow third parties to use the system as reference for their research. As a result, security researchers often have to work with abstract and simplified system assumptions, which might not translate well to practice. In this work, we provide a comprehensive overview of the network services provided by industrial devices found in the EPIC (Electric Power and Intelligent Control) system at SUTD. We provide a detailed network topology of the different network segments, enumerate hosts, models, protocols, and services provided. We argue that such a detailed system description can serve as an enabler for more practical security research. In particular, we discuss how the reported information can be used for emulating a diverse set of important threat scenarios in the smart grid domain. In addition, the provided details allow other researchers to build more detailed models or simulations.","PeriodicalId":296635,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 4th ACM Workshop on Cyber-Physical System Security","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"23","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 4th ACM Workshop on Cyber-Physical System Security","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3198458.3198461","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 23

Abstract

Industrial control system networks in real world usually require a complex composition of many different devices, protocols, and services. Unfortunately, such practical setups are rarely documented publicly in sufficient technical detail to allow third parties to use the system as reference for their research. As a result, security researchers often have to work with abstract and simplified system assumptions, which might not translate well to practice. In this work, we provide a comprehensive overview of the network services provided by industrial devices found in the EPIC (Electric Power and Intelligent Control) system at SUTD. We provide a detailed network topology of the different network segments, enumerate hosts, models, protocols, and services provided. We argue that such a detailed system description can serve as an enabler for more practical security research. In particular, we discuss how the reported information can be used for emulating a diverse set of important threat scenarios in the smart grid domain. In addition, the provided details allow other researchers to build more detailed models or simulations.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
电力ICS试验台实际威胁场景测试研究
现实世界中的工业控制系统网络通常需要许多不同设备、协议和服务的复杂组合。不幸的是,这样的实际设置很少公开记录足够的技术细节,以允许第三方使用该系统作为他们研究的参考。因此,安全研究人员经常不得不使用抽象和简化的系统假设,这可能无法很好地转化为实践。在这项工作中,我们全面概述了SUTD EPIC(电力和智能控制)系统中工业设备提供的网络服务。我们提供了不同网段的详细网络拓扑,列举了所提供的主机、模型、协议和服务。我们认为,这种详细的系统描述可以作为更实际的安全研究的推动者。特别地,我们讨论了如何将报告的信息用于模拟智能电网领域中的各种重要威胁场景。此外,提供的细节允许其他研究人员建立更详细的模型或模拟。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
Session details: Keynote 2 Too Long, did not Enforce: A Qualitative Hierarchical Risk-Aware Data Usage Control Model for Complex Policies in Distributed Environments Towards Security-Aware Virtual Environments for Digital Twins On The Limits of Detecting Process Anomalies in Critical Infrastructure Leaky CPS: Inferring Cyber Information from Physical Properties (and the other way around)
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1