Pierre Fleckinger, M. Glachant, Paul-Hervé Tamokoué Kamga
{"title":"Energy Performance Certificates and Investments in Building Energy Efficiency: A Theoretical Analysis","authors":"Pierre Fleckinger, M. Glachant, Paul-Hervé Tamokoué Kamga","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3253030","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In the European Union, Energy Performance Certificates (EPCs) provide potential buyers or tenants with information on a property's energy performance. By mitigating informational asymmetries on real estate markets, the conventional wisdom is that they will reduce energy use, increase energy-efficiency investments, and improve social welfare. We develop a dynamic model that partly contradicts these predictions. Although EPCs always improve social welfare, their impact on energy use and investments is ambiguous. This implies that, in a second-best world where energy externalities are under-priced and/or homeowners have behavioral biases hindering investments (myopia), EPCs can damage social welfare. This calls for using mandatory energy labeling in contexts where additional instruments efficiently mitigate the other imperfections.","PeriodicalId":105811,"journal":{"name":"Econometric Modeling: Agriculture","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"26","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Econometric Modeling: Agriculture","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3253030","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 26
Abstract
In the European Union, Energy Performance Certificates (EPCs) provide potential buyers or tenants with information on a property's energy performance. By mitigating informational asymmetries on real estate markets, the conventional wisdom is that they will reduce energy use, increase energy-efficiency investments, and improve social welfare. We develop a dynamic model that partly contradicts these predictions. Although EPCs always improve social welfare, their impact on energy use and investments is ambiguous. This implies that, in a second-best world where energy externalities are under-priced and/or homeowners have behavioral biases hindering investments (myopia), EPCs can damage social welfare. This calls for using mandatory energy labeling in contexts where additional instruments efficiently mitigate the other imperfections.