Doing More with Less: Improved Targeting of Social Programs for Maximum Impact

M. Mcinnes, Orgul D. Ozturk, S. McDermott, J. Mann
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Abstract

Social programs are increasingly asked to do more with less, but how is this possible? In this paper we consider one such program, supported employment, which is designed to increase employment among adults with intellectual disabilities. We estimate a model which allows for heterogeneous benefits from participation which in turn is allowed to affect the individual's decision to participate. We find that the average treatment effects for the population exceed that of the treated group. The contribution of this paper is to develop alternative schemes for targeting program resources and to measure any gains that result. In our simulations, we find employment under the current program is 1.38%, and this could be increased to an upper bound of 17.1% by an omniscient program administrator who can perfectly target those who gain most. While we assume that program administrators know more about individual program participants than we do, we can consider an administrator who has only the information available to the econometrician. In this case, targeting gains based only on observable characteristics would lead to 12.4% employment. Surprisingly, a simple rule that only requires administrators to predict employment success when treated (based on observables) will achieve almost the same results.
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用更少的钱做更多的事:改进社会项目的目标以获得最大的影响
社会项目越来越多地被要求用更少的钱做更多的事,但这是怎么可能的呢?在本文中,我们考虑了一个这样的计划,支持就业,这是旨在增加就业的智力残疾的成年人。我们估计了一个模型,该模型允许从参与中获得异质收益,这反过来又允许影响个人的参与决策。我们发现人群的平均治疗效果超过了治疗组。本文的贡献在于开发了针对项目资源的替代方案,并衡量了由此产生的任何收益。在我们的模拟中,我们发现当前计划下的就业率为1.38%,如果一个无所不知的计划管理员能够完美地瞄准那些收益最大的人,就业率可以提高到17.1%的上限。当我们假设项目管理员比我们更了解单个项目参与者时,我们可以考虑一个只拥有计量经济学家可用信息的管理员。在这种情况下,仅基于可观察特征的目标收益将导致12.4%的就业率。令人惊讶的是,一个简单的规则,只要求管理员在处理(基于可观察到的)时预测就业成功,将达到几乎相同的结果。
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