{"title":"Why Do Emerging Economies Borrow Short Term?","authors":"F. Broner, G. Lorenzoni, S. Schmukler","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.859604","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The authors argue that emerging economies borrow short term due to the high risk premium charged by international capital markets on long-term debt. They first present a model where the debt maturity structure is the outcome of a risk-sharing problem between the government and bondholders. By issuing long-term debt, the government lowers the probability of a liquidity crisis, transferring risk to bondholders. In equilibrium, this risk is reflected in a higher risk premium and borrowing cost. Therefore, the government faces a tradeoff between safer long-term borrowing and cheaper short-term debt. Second, the authors construct a new database of sovereign bond prices and issuance. They show that emerging economies pay a positive term premium (a higher risk premium on long-term bonds than on short-term bonds). During crises, the term premium increases, with issuance shifting toward shorter maturities. This suggests that changes in bondholders' risk aversion are important to understand emerging market crises.","PeriodicalId":247622,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Fiscal & Monetary Policy in Developing Economies (Topic)","volume":"28 4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2004-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"18","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Fiscal & Monetary Policy in Developing Economies (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.859604","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 18
Abstract
The authors argue that emerging economies borrow short term due to the high risk premium charged by international capital markets on long-term debt. They first present a model where the debt maturity structure is the outcome of a risk-sharing problem between the government and bondholders. By issuing long-term debt, the government lowers the probability of a liquidity crisis, transferring risk to bondholders. In equilibrium, this risk is reflected in a higher risk premium and borrowing cost. Therefore, the government faces a tradeoff between safer long-term borrowing and cheaper short-term debt. Second, the authors construct a new database of sovereign bond prices and issuance. They show that emerging economies pay a positive term premium (a higher risk premium on long-term bonds than on short-term bonds). During crises, the term premium increases, with issuance shifting toward shorter maturities. This suggests that changes in bondholders' risk aversion are important to understand emerging market crises.