OVERINVESTMENT AND OVERBORROWING UNDER THE DEBT CONTRACTS

M. Sakuragawa
{"title":"OVERINVESTMENT AND OVERBORROWING UNDER THE DEBT CONTRACTS","authors":"M. Sakuragawa","doi":"10.11398/ECONOMICS1986.44.216","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In the presence of asymmetric information between a lender and a borrower with costly monitoring, we investigate a contract form and an optimal loan size are investigated. The optimal contract has the features of a standard debt contract. However, the optimal loan size does not always take the form of maximum equity participation. If per unit of return from lending is a decreasing function of the loan size, the contract takes the form of maxi mumequity participation. Conversely, if per unit of return from lending is an increasing function of the loan size, overinvestment or overborrowing may arise.","PeriodicalId":271985,"journal":{"name":"The Economic studies quarterly","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1993-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Economic studies quarterly","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.11398/ECONOMICS1986.44.216","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1

Abstract

In the presence of asymmetric information between a lender and a borrower with costly monitoring, we investigate a contract form and an optimal loan size are investigated. The optimal contract has the features of a standard debt contract. However, the optimal loan size does not always take the form of maximum equity participation. If per unit of return from lending is a decreasing function of the loan size, the contract takes the form of maxi mumequity participation. Conversely, if per unit of return from lending is an increasing function of the loan size, overinvestment or overborrowing may arise.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
债务合同下的过度投资和过度借贷
在借贷双方存在信息不对称的情况下,我们研究了一种契约形式,并研究了最优贷款规模。最优契约具有标准债务契约的特征。然而,最优贷款规模并不总是采取最大股权参与的形式。如果单位贷款收益是贷款规模的递减函数,则合同采用最大股权参与的形式。相反,如果贷款的单位回报是贷款规模的递增函数,则可能出现过度投资或过度借贷。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
金本良嗣•宮島洋編「公共セクターの効率化」東京大学出版会,1991年,vi+240ページ,3914円 本間正義著「農業問題の政治経済学」日本経済新聞社,1994年,vi+278ページ,2000円 渡辺努著「市場の予想と経済政策の有効性-国際金融政策のゲーム論的分析」東洋経済新報社,1994年,ix+229ページ,3800円 清野一治著「規制と競争の経済学」東京大学出版会,1993年,ix+371ページ,4944円 刈屋武昭著「計量経済分析法の新展開-金融分析•景気分析•予想形成」岩波書店,1994年,ix+197ページ,4500円
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1