CPS: market analysis of attacks against demand response in the smart grid

Proceedings of the 30th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference Pub Date : 2014-12-08 DOI:10.1145/2664243.2664284

C. Barreto, A. Cárdenas, N. Quijano, E. Mojica-Nava

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引用次数: 26

Abstract

Demand response systems assume an electricity retail-market with strategic electricity consuming agents. The goal in these systems is to design load shaping mechanisms to achieve efficiency of resources and customer satisfaction. Recent research efforts have studied the impact of integrity attacks in simplified versions of the demand response problem, where neither the load consuming agents nor the adversary are strategic. In this paper, we study the impact of integrity attacks considering strategic players (a social planner or a consumer) and a strategic attacker. We identify two types of attackers: (1) a malicious attacker who wants to damage the equipment in the power grid by producing sudden overloads, and (2) a selfish attacker that wants to defraud the system by compromising and then manipulating control (load shaping) signals. We then explore the resiliency of two different demand response systems to these fraudsters and malicious attackers. Our results provide guidelines for system operators deciding which type of demand-response system they want to implement, how to secure them, and directions for detecting these attacks.

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CPS:智能电网需求响应攻击的市场分析

需求响应系统假设电力零售市场具有战略电力消费代理。这些系统的目标是设计负载塑造机制，以实现资源效率和客户满意度。最近的研究工作在需求响应问题的简化版本中研究了完整性攻击的影响，其中消耗负载的代理和对手都不是战略性的。在本文中，我们研究了考虑战略参与者(社会规划师或消费者)和战略攻击者的完整性攻击的影响。我们确定了两种类型的攻击者:(1)恶意攻击者，他们想通过产生突然过载来破坏电网中的设备;(2)自私的攻击者，他们想通过妥协和操纵控制(负载整形)信号来欺骗系统。然后，我们探讨了两种不同的需求响应系统对这些欺诈者和恶意攻击者的弹性。我们的结果为系统操作员决定他们想要实现哪种类型的需求响应系统，如何保护它们以及检测这些攻击的方向提供了指导。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Proceedings of the 30th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference

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