RANDOMIZATION OF CSIDH ALGORITHM ON QUADRATIC AND TWISTED EDWARDS CURVES

A. Bessalov, Ludmila Kovalchuk, Sergey Abramov
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

The properties of quadratic and twisted supersingular Edwards curves that form pairs of quadratic twist with order over a prime field are considered. A modification of the CSIDH algorithm based on odd degree isogenies of these curves is considered. A simple model for the implementation of the CSIDH algorithm in 3 minimal odd isogeny degrees 3, 5, 7, with the prime field modulus and the order of supersingular curves is constructed. At the precipitation stage, the parameters of isogenic chains of all degrees for these two classes of supersingular Edwards curves are calculated and tabulated. An example of the implementation of the CSIDH algorithm as a non-interactive secret sharing scheme based on the secret and public keys of Alice and Bob is given. A new randomized CSIDH algorithm with a random equiprobable choice of one of the curves of these two classes at each step of the isogeny chain is proposed. The choice of the degree of each isogeny is randomized. The operation of the randomized algorithm by an example is illustrated. This algorithm as a possible alternative to "CSIDH with constant time" is considered. A combination of the two approaches is possible to counter side channel attacks. Estimates of the probability of a successful side-channel attack in a randomized algorithm are given. It is noted that all calculations in the CSIDH algorithm necessary to calculate the shared secret are reduced only to calculating the parameter of the isogenic curve and are performed by field and group operations, in particular, scalar point multiplications and doubling points of the isogeny kernel. In the new algorithm we propose to abandon the calculation of the isogenic function of random point , which significantly speeds up the algorithm.
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二次和扭转Edwards曲线上csidh算法的随机化
研究了在素域上形成二阶扭转对的二次和扭转超奇异Edwards曲线的性质。提出了一种基于曲线奇次等同性的改进CSIDH算法。构造了具有素数场模和超奇异曲线阶数的最小奇等构度3,5,7的CSIDH算法实现的简单模型。在降水阶段,对这两类超奇异Edwards曲线的各度等基因链参数进行了计算和制表。给出了基于Alice和Bob的私钥和公钥的CSIDH算法作为非交互式秘密共享方案的实现实例。提出了一种新的随机化CSIDH算法,该算法在等基因链的每一步随机选择这两类曲线中的一条。每个同基因的程度的选择是随机的。通过实例说明了随机化算法的具体操作。考虑了该算法作为“恒时间CSIDH”的一种可能替代方案。两种方法的结合可以对抗侧信道攻击。给出了一种随机算法中侧信道攻击成功概率的估计。值得注意的是,在CSIDH算法中,计算共享秘密所需的所有计算都简化为计算等基因曲线的参数,并通过场和群运算来完成,特别是标量点乘法和等基因核的加倍点。在新算法中,我们提出放弃计算随机点的等基因函数,这大大提高了算法的速度。
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