Dynamic evolution of supply chain fairness based on Stackelberg and Nash bargaining game model

Abstract

According to the rationality degree of retailer and information completeness of fairness concern, the information structure of retailer's fairness concern can be divided into four stages. Then, we set Stackelberg and Nash bargaining game model and use the reverse induction method to compute the subjective and objective efficiency of supply chain in each stage, and the “fair entropy” is introduced to calculate the subjective and objective fairness degree of supply chain so as to analyze how the asymmetric fairness information affect the dynamic change of supply chain efficiency and fairness degree in terms of subjective and objective dimensions. By comparative analysis, we prove that the supply chain can't achieve coordination and maximum fairness degree under Stackelberg game model, while the supply chain can achieve coordination and maximize fairness degree in term of utility under Nash bargaining game model. Besides, Nash bargaining game model is more conducive to improve supply chain efficiency and harmonious development of supply chain channel than Stackelberg game model.