{"title":"The Risk-Taking Channel of Monetary Policy in the USA: Evidence from Micro-Level Data","authors":"M. Delis, I. Hasan, N. Mylonidis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2013787","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"There is a growing consensus that a prolonged period of low interest rates can exert a negative impact on financial stability through the risk-taking incentives of banks. Using micro-level datasets from the US banking sector, this paper finds evidence of a highly significant negative relationship between monetary policy rates and bank-risk taking. This finding remains robust across various specifications, sub-periods and subsamples, thereby confirming the presence of an active risk-taking channel of monetary policy since the 1990s. The results, therefore, support the new responsibilities of the Fed on macro-prudential supervision to monitor systemic risks.","PeriodicalId":431629,"journal":{"name":"Econometrics: Applied Econometric Modeling in Financial Economics eJournal","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2012-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"40","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Econometrics: Applied Econometric Modeling in Financial Economics eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2013787","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 40
Abstract
There is a growing consensus that a prolonged period of low interest rates can exert a negative impact on financial stability through the risk-taking incentives of banks. Using micro-level datasets from the US banking sector, this paper finds evidence of a highly significant negative relationship between monetary policy rates and bank-risk taking. This finding remains robust across various specifications, sub-periods and subsamples, thereby confirming the presence of an active risk-taking channel of monetary policy since the 1990s. The results, therefore, support the new responsibilities of the Fed on macro-prudential supervision to monitor systemic risks.