{"title":"Solving the Congressional Review Act’s Conundrum","authors":"C. Coglianese","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3567230","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Congress routinely enacts statutes mandating that federal agencies adopt specific regulations. For example, when Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010, it required the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to adopt a regulation compelling energy companies to disclose payments they make to governmental entities. Although this disclosure regulation is specifically required by the Dodd-Frank Act, it is also a regulation subject to disapproval by Congress under a process outlined in a separate statute known as the Congressional Review Act (CRA). \n \nIn 2017, Congress passed a joint resolution disapproving the SEC’s disclosure rule under the process authorized in the CRA. That resolution nullified the SEC’s rule, but it did not amend the Dodd-Frank Act. It did, though, make relevant a provision in the CRA that prohibits an agency from adopting any regulation that is “substantially the same” as one that Congress has disapproved. As a result, the SEC still must issue a disclosure regulation, but it cannot issue one that is substantially the same as the old one. Although normally this might not pose a major problem to an agency, the Dodd-Frank Act not only requires a disclosure regulation, it also provides considerable detail about what must be included in that regulation. \n \nThe SEC faces what appears to be a conundrum. On the one hand, it must adopt a regulation that comports with the detailed provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act. But on the other hand, it is prohibited under the CRA from adopting a regulation that is “substantially the same” as the old regulation. What is the agency to do? Earlier this year, the SEC announced a proposal for a new disclosure regulation that differs in several ways from the old one—but the proposed regulation would also appear in some respects to violate the Dodd-Frank Act’s requirements for how the disclosure rule should be designed. \n \nIn this paper—originally submitted as a public comment on the SEC’s proposed rule—I explain that the SEC need not violate the Dodd-Frank Act to comply with the CRA. The CRA conundrum can be readily solved. The CRA’s choice of the imprecise word “substantially” invites the SEC to reconcile both statutes. The agency can do so by ensuring that those features of a new regulation that remain in the SEC’s discretion are not substantially the same as in the old rule. After all, a statute such as the CRA can only impose an obligation on an agency over matters over which it has a choice. The SEC just needs to make sure that any re-issued rule is no longer substantially the same in terms of portions of the rule over which the agency can exercise its discretion. \n \nEven with detailed statutory provisions, such as the one in the Dodd-Frank Act, an agency nevertheless will still have some discretion available to it. It can exercise that discretion in a substantially different way even if by making available opportunities for waivers or by extending deadlines for compliance. The disapproval of a rule under the CRA simply does not relieve an agency from its obligation to produce a regulation that complies with other statutory obligations.","PeriodicalId":198853,"journal":{"name":"Compliance & Risk Management eJournal","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Compliance & Risk Management eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3567230","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Congress routinely enacts statutes mandating that federal agencies adopt specific regulations. For example, when Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010, it required the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to adopt a regulation compelling energy companies to disclose payments they make to governmental entities. Although this disclosure regulation is specifically required by the Dodd-Frank Act, it is also a regulation subject to disapproval by Congress under a process outlined in a separate statute known as the Congressional Review Act (CRA).
In 2017, Congress passed a joint resolution disapproving the SEC’s disclosure rule under the process authorized in the CRA. That resolution nullified the SEC’s rule, but it did not amend the Dodd-Frank Act. It did, though, make relevant a provision in the CRA that prohibits an agency from adopting any regulation that is “substantially the same” as one that Congress has disapproved. As a result, the SEC still must issue a disclosure regulation, but it cannot issue one that is substantially the same as the old one. Although normally this might not pose a major problem to an agency, the Dodd-Frank Act not only requires a disclosure regulation, it also provides considerable detail about what must be included in that regulation.
The SEC faces what appears to be a conundrum. On the one hand, it must adopt a regulation that comports with the detailed provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act. But on the other hand, it is prohibited under the CRA from adopting a regulation that is “substantially the same” as the old regulation. What is the agency to do? Earlier this year, the SEC announced a proposal for a new disclosure regulation that differs in several ways from the old one—but the proposed regulation would also appear in some respects to violate the Dodd-Frank Act’s requirements for how the disclosure rule should be designed.
In this paper—originally submitted as a public comment on the SEC’s proposed rule—I explain that the SEC need not violate the Dodd-Frank Act to comply with the CRA. The CRA conundrum can be readily solved. The CRA’s choice of the imprecise word “substantially” invites the SEC to reconcile both statutes. The agency can do so by ensuring that those features of a new regulation that remain in the SEC’s discretion are not substantially the same as in the old rule. After all, a statute such as the CRA can only impose an obligation on an agency over matters over which it has a choice. The SEC just needs to make sure that any re-issued rule is no longer substantially the same in terms of portions of the rule over which the agency can exercise its discretion.
Even with detailed statutory provisions, such as the one in the Dodd-Frank Act, an agency nevertheless will still have some discretion available to it. It can exercise that discretion in a substantially different way even if by making available opportunities for waivers or by extending deadlines for compliance. The disapproval of a rule under the CRA simply does not relieve an agency from its obligation to produce a regulation that complies with other statutory obligations.
国会经常颁布法令,要求联邦机构采用具体的规章制度。例如,2010年国会通过《多德-弗兰克华尔街改革与消费者保护法》(Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act)时,要求美国证券交易委员会(SEC)制定一项法规,强制要求能源公司披露它们向政府实体支付的款项。虽然这一披露规定是多德-弗兰克法案特别要求的,但它也是国会根据另一项被称为国会审查法案(CRA)的单独法规概述的程序而不批准的规定。2017年,国会通过了一项联合决议,否决了SEC根据CRA授权的流程制定的披露规则。该决议取消了SEC的规定,但没有修改《多德-弗兰克法案》。不过,它确实在CRA中制定了相关条款,禁止机构采用与国会不批准的法规“实质上相同”的法规。因此,SEC仍然必须发布披露法规,但它不能发布与旧法规基本相同的法规。虽然通常情况下,这可能不会对机构构成重大问题,但《多德-弗兰克法案》(Dodd-Frank Act)不仅要求制定披露规定,还对该规定必须包括的内容提供了相当详细的规定。证交会似乎面临着一个难题。一方面,它必须采用一项符合多德-弗兰克法案详细条款的监管规定。但另一方面,CRA禁止采用与旧法规“基本相同”的法规。该机构该怎么做?今年早些时候,SEC宣布了一项新的信息披露法规提案,该提案在许多方面与旧法规有所不同,但在某些方面,拟议的法规似乎也违反了《多德-弗兰克法案》(Dodd-Frank Act)关于如何设计信息披露规则的要求。在这篇最初作为对SEC拟议规则的公众评论提交的论文中,我解释说SEC不需要违反《多德-弗兰克法案》来遵守CRA。CRA难题很容易解决。CRA选择了“实质上”这个不精确的词,这使得SEC不得不调和这两项法规。该机构可以通过确保新规定中保留在SEC自由裁量权范围内的特征与旧规则中的特征在本质上不同来做到这一点。毕竟,像CRA这样的法规只能在机构可以选择的事项上对其施加义务。SEC只需要确保任何重新发布的规则在该机构可以行使其自由裁量权的部分方面不再本质上相同。即使有详细的法律规定,如多德-弗兰克法案,一个机构仍然会有一些自由裁量权。它可以以一种完全不同的方式行使自由裁量权,即使是提供放弃的机会或延长遵守的最后期限。对CRA规定的不赞成并不能免除机构制定符合其他法定义务的规定的义务。