Chelpanov: The Psychologist as a Realist Neo-Kantian

Abstract

This essay explores the writings of Georgij Chelpanov, who recognized the value of both psychology and philosophy, much to the displeasure of all. Chelpanov only very guardedly expressed his own philosophical views, which stand, I conclude, in stark contrast with the neo-Kantianisms of both the Marburg and the Baden Schools. We see that in his earliest writings on spatial perception, he not so much differs with Kant as saw the matter from a different perspective. Nonetheless, he shares Kant’s affirmation that the universality and necessity associated with our representation of space affirms its apriority as a condition of cognition, particularly with respect to mathematics. Chelpanov departs from Kant in rejecting the exclusive subjectivity of space and time, arguing that there is something in noumenal reality that corresponds to our specific representations of an object’s temporal and spatial position. Otherwise, there is no way to account for their specificity, for why a perceived object is here and not there. Chelpanov argues this from a psychological viewpoint, but he acknowledges that Kant argues from a logical viewpoint. Turning to the issue of free will, he, in short, argues for a soft determinism that is quite consistent with Kantianism, even though Chelpanov’s argument is bereft of the metaphysics and the architectonic of Kant’s system. In conclusion, although scholars dispute his allegiance to neo-Kantianism, his philosophical writings demonstrate his subdued advocacy of a neo-Kantianism, albeit one more akin to the transcendental realism of Riehl and Paulsen.