I Don’t 'Recall': The Decision to Delay Innovation Launch to Avoid Costly Product Failure

Byungyeon Kim, Oded Koenigsberg, E. Ofek
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

Innovations embody novel features or cutting-edge components aimed at delivering desired customer benefits. Oftentimes, however, we observe the need to recall new products shortly after their introduction. Indeed, a firm may rush an innovation to market in an attempt to pre-empt rivals and capture early demand, yet in so doing forgo rigorous testing, thus subjecting itself to the risk of a product recall. To shed light on this phenomenon, we construct a dynamic game-theoretic model in which firms plan to launch their innovations. Each firm must decide whether to conduct time-consuming quality assurance testing, which ensures no defects or safety problems but delays the launch. If the innovation is released without such testing and a recall occurs, the firm incurs pecuniary costs and faces future reputation damage in marketing the recalled innovation. We investigate the strategic forces behind firms’ testing and launch-timing decisions in this context. The analysis uncovers a novel mechanism, linked to the possibility of a rival going bankrupt, that causes firms to become more inclined to rush to market and take on the risk of product failure even as the negative consequences of a recall increase. The results further demonstrate how firms’ desire to forgo testing exhibits an inverse-U pattern as consumers become more heterogeneous and how competitive forces may induce both firms to forgo testing, although the resulting profits are lower than had they both committed to conduct testing. The framework is extended to examine how product recall considerations affect firms’ research and development (R&D) investments. Although, in general, post-innovation product failure discourages R&D effort, we identify conditions under which an increase in the recall probability stimulates firms to innovate. Several model extensions are presented, and managerial implications are discussed. This paper was accepted by Dmitri Kuksov, marketing.
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我不“回忆”:推迟创新推出以避免代价高昂的产品失败的决定
创新体现了新颖的功能或尖端的组件,旨在提供预期的客户利益。然而,我们经常观察到新产品在推出后不久就需要召回。事实上,一家公司可能会急于将一项创新推向市场,试图抢占竞争对手的先机,抓住早期需求,但这样做却放弃了严格的测试,从而使自己面临产品召回的风险。为了阐明这一现象,我们构建了一个动态博弈论模型,在这个模型中,企业计划推出他们的创新。每家公司必须决定是否进行耗时的质量保证测试,这种测试确保没有缺陷或安全问题,但会推迟发布。如果创新产品没有经过这样的测试就发布了,并且发生了召回,公司就会产生金钱成本,并且在营销召回的创新产品时面临声誉损害。在此背景下,我们研究了公司测试和发布时间决策背后的战略力量。分析揭示了一种新的机制,这种机制与竞争对手破产的可能性有关,这种机制导致企业更倾向于冲进市场,承担产品失败的风险,即使召回的负面后果增加。研究结果进一步表明,随着消费者变得更加异质,企业放弃检测的意愿呈现出反u型模式,以及竞争力量如何诱使两家公司放弃检测,尽管由此产生的利润低于两家公司都承诺进行检测。该框架被扩展到研究产品召回的考虑如何影响企业的研发投资。虽然,在一般情况下,创新后的产品失败阻碍了研发努力,但我们确定了召回概率增加刺激企业创新的条件。提出了几个模型扩展,并讨论了管理意义。这篇论文被市场部的Dmitri Kuksov接受。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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