HoRStify: Sound Security Analysis of Smart Contracts

Sebastian Holler, Sebastian Biewer, Clara Schneidewind
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Abstract

The cryptocurrency Ethereum is the most widely used execution platform for smart contracts. Smart contracts are distributed applications, which govern financial assets and, hence, can implement advanced financial instruments, such as decentralized exchanges or autonomous organizations (DAOs). Their financial nature makes smart contracts an attractive attack target, as demonstrated by numerous exploits on popular contracts resulting in financial damage of millions of dollars. This omnipresent attack hazard motivates the need for sound static analysis tools, which assist smart contract developers in eliminating contract vulnerabilities a priori to deployment. Vulnerability assessment that is sound and insightful for EVM contracts is a formidable challenge because contracts execute low-level bytecode in a largely unknown and potentially hostile execution environment. So far, there exists no provably sound automated analyzer that allows for the verification of security properties based on program dependencies, even though prevalent attack classes fall into this category. In this work, we present HoRStify, the first automated analyzer for dependency properties of Ethereum smart contracts based on sound static analysis. HoRStify grounds its soundness proof on a formal proof framework for static program slicing that we instantiate to the semantics of EVM bytecode. We demonstrate that HoRStify is flexible enough to soundly verify the absence of famous attack classes such as timestamp dependency and, at the same time, performant enough to analyze real-world smart contracts.
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HoRStify:智能合约的可靠安全性分析
加密货币以太坊是智能合约使用最广泛的执行平台。智能合约是分布式应用程序,它管理金融资产,因此可以实现先进的金融工具,例如去中心化交易所或自治组织(dao)。它们的金融性质使智能合约成为一个有吸引力的攻击目标,正如对流行合约的大量利用所证明的那样,造成了数百万美元的经济损失。这种无处不在的攻击危险激发了对健全的静态分析工具的需求,这些工具可以帮助智能合约开发人员消除部署之前的合约漏洞。对EVM合约进行可靠而深刻的漏洞评估是一项艰巨的挑战,因为合约在一个很大程度上未知且可能存在敌意的执行环境中执行低级字节码。到目前为止,还没有可靠的自动化分析器允许基于程序依赖项验证安全属性,尽管流行的攻击类属于这一类。在这项工作中,我们提出了HoRStify,这是基于健全静态分析的以太坊智能合约依赖属性的第一个自动分析器。HoRStify将其可靠性证明建立在静态程序切片的正式证明框架上,我们将其实例化为EVM字节码的语义。我们证明了HoRStify足够灵活,可以很好地验证时间戳依赖等著名攻击类的缺失,同时,它的性能足以分析现实世界的智能合约。
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